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Abstract
We study a routing game in an environment with multiple heterogeneous in-
formation systems and an uncertain state that affects edge costs of a congested
network. Each information system sends a noisy signal about the state to its sub-
scribed traveler population. Travelers make route choices based on their private
beliefs about the state and other populations’ signals. The question then arises,
“How does the presence of asymmetric and incomplete information affect the trav-
elers’ equilibrium route choices and costs?” We develop a systematic approach to
characterize the equilibrium structure, and determine the effect of population sizes
on the relative value of information (i.e. difference in expected traveler costs) be-
tween any two populations. This effect can be evaluated using a population-specific
size threshold. One population enjoys a strictly positive value of information in
comparison to the other if and only if its size is below the corresponding threshold.
We also consider the situation when travelers may choose an information system
based on its value, and characterize the set of equilibrium adoption rates delineat-
ing the sizes of subscribed traveler populations. The resulting routing strategies
are such that all travelers face an identical expected cost, and no traveler has the
incentive to change her subscription.
Index Term: Nonatomic games, Transportation technology, Information sys-
tems.
1 Introduction
Travelers are increasingly relying on traffic navigation services to make their route choice
decisions. In the past decade, numerous services have come to the forefront, including
Waze/Google maps, Apple maps, INRIX, etc. These Traffic Information Systems (TISs)
provide their subscribers with costless information about the uncertain network condi-
tion (state), which is typically influenced by several exogenous factors such as weather,
incidents, and road conditions. The information provided by TIS can be especially useful
in making travel decisions when a change in state corresponds to changes in travel times
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of multiple edges of the network. Experiential evidence suggests that the accuracy levels
of TISs are less than perfect, and exhibit heterogeneities due to the inherent technolog-
ical differences in data collection and analysis approaches. Moreover, travelers may use
different TISs or choose not to use them at all, depending on factors such as marketing,
usability, and availability. Therefore, we can reasonably expect that travelers face an
environment of asymmetric and incomplete information about the network state.
Importantly, information heterogeneity can directly influence the travelers’ route choice
decisions, and the resulting congestion externalities. For example, travelers who are in-
formed by their TIS that a certain route has an incident and take a detour may not
only reduce their own travel time, but also benefit the uninformed travelers by shifting
traffic away from the affected route. However, if too many travelers take the detour, then
this alternate route will also start getting congested, limiting the benefits of information.
Thus, the question arises as to how information heterogeneity impacts the travelers route
choice and costs.
In this article, we develop a game-theoretic approach to study this question. We
consider a routing game in which the travelers are privately informed about the network
state by their respective TIS, and choose strategies based on their beliefs about the state
and other travelers’ behavior. Our approach enables a systematic study of equilibrium
structure and travel costs for this routing game. The game is played on a general network
by multiple traveler populations that are heterogeneous in the access and accuracy of state
information. Specifically, we provide a complete characterization of how the population
size vector impacts the equilibrium structure and the relative value of information faced
by travelers subscribed to one TIS in comparison to the ones subscribed to another TIS.
Furthermore, we study the situation in which travelers can choose their TIS subscrip-
tion based on the relative values of different available TISs. In general, the adoption rate
of one TIS (i.e. the fraction of travelers subscribing to it) depends on a variety of factors
such as TIS accuracies, uncertainty in network states, and cost parameters. Thus, deter-
mining the equilibrium adoption rates is a non-trivial yet practically-relevant problem.
We provide a rather straightforward characterization of the set of equilibrium adoption
rates. Particularly, we show that this set is comprised of the population size vectors for
which all travelers face an identical expected cost in equilibrium (i.e. social fairness is
achieved), and no traveler has an incentive to change her TIS subscription (i.e. stability
is achieved).
1.1 Our Model and Contributions
We model the traffic routing problem in an asymmetric and incomplete information envi-
ronment as a Bayesian routing game. We consider a general traffic network with a single
origin-destination pair, and an uncertain state that is realized from a finite set according
to a prior probability distribution. The cost function (travel time) of each edge in the
network is increasing in the aggregate traffic load on that edge. Moreover, the edge costs
are state-dependent in that the state can affect them in various ways. All travelers have
identical preferences, and the total demand is inelastic. There are multiple heterogeneous
TISs, each sending a noisy signal of the state to its subscribed traveler population. The
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signal sent by each TIS is privately known to only its subscribers, but the joint distribu-
tion of the state and all signals is known by all travelers (common knowledge). This joint
distribution is the common prior of the game, and each population’s private belief of the
state and other populations private signals is derived from it. Our information environ-
ment is general in that we do not impose any structural assumption on the common prior.
The signals of different TISs can be correlated or independent, conditional on the state.
Also, one TIS can be more accurate than another in some states, but less in the other
states. Therefore, we do not assume that the TISs are ordered according to the accuracy
of their signals.
We use Bayesian Wardrop Equilibrium (BWE) as the solution concept of our game.
In a BWE, all populations assign demand on routes with the smallest expected cost based
on their private beliefs. In fact, our game is a weighted potential game, i.e. the set of
BWE is the optimal solution set of a convex optimization problem that minimizes the
weighted potential function over the set of feasible routing strategies of traveler popula-
tions (Theorem 1). This property establishes the essential uniqueness of BWE, i.e. the
equilibrium edge load vector is unique. However, the strategy-based optimization problem
is not directly useful for analyzing how the set of equilibrium strategies and population
costs depend on the population size vector. To address this issue, we provide a charac-
terization of the set of feasible route flows (i.e. route flows induced by feasible strategy
profiles) as a convex polytope (Proposition 1), and show that this set is the optimal so-
lution set of another convex optimization problem (Proposition 2). The optimal value of
this flow-based formulation is the value of weighted potential function in equilibrium.
The flow-based formulation enables us to analyze the sensitivity of equilibrium struc-
ture with respect to perturbations in the size vector. The constraints in this formulation
include: basic route feasibility constraints, a set of size-independent equality constraints,
and a set of size-dependent inequality constraints. The equality constraints ensure that
any shift in route flows resulting from a change of signal received by one population
is independent of the signals received by other populations. Each inequality constraint
corresponds to a single population, and ensures that the maximum extent to which the
received signals impact its equilibrium routing behavior is limited by the population’s size.
Hence, we refer to these inequality constraints as information impact constraints (IICs).
Consequently, the effects of perturbation in the size vector on the equilibrium structure
can be studied by evaluating the tightness of the IICs corresponding to the perturbed
populations at the optimum of the flow-based formulation.
In particular, Theorem 2 describes how the qualitative properties of equilibrium route
flows change under perturbations in the sizes of any two populations, with sizes of all
other populations being fixed (i.e. directional perturbations of the size vector). Among
the two perturbed populations, we say that a population is the “minor population” if
its size is smaller than a certain (population-specific) threshold. The corresponding IIC
is tight in equilibrium, i.e. the impact of information on the minor population is fully
attained. These population-specific thresholds depend on the common prior distribution
as well as sizes of all other populations, and each threshold can be computed by solving
a linear program. Based on the two thresholds, we can distinguish three qualitatively
distinct equilibrium regimes: In the two side regimes exactly one population assumes the
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minority role, on the other hand, in the middle regime neither population is minor.
We can apply Theorem 2 to analyze the sensitivity of the equilibrium value of the
weighted potential function under directional perturbation of population sizes (Proposi-
tion 3). In the middle regime, perturbing the relative sizes does not change the equilibrium
value of the potential function. On the other hand, in the two side regimes the value of the
potential function monotonically decreases as the size of the minor population increases.
Thanks to the essential uniqueness of BWE, the equilibrium edge load vector does not
change with this directional perturbation if and only if the size vector falls in the middle
regime.
These results allow us to compare the expected cost in equilibrium faced by travelers in
any pair of populations. In particular, we can evaluate how this cost difference — which we
call the relative value of information — changes with pairwise size perturbations. By using
the results on sensitivity analysis of general convex optimization problems (Fiacco [1984],
Rockafellar [1984]), we show that the relative value of information is proportional to the
derivative of the equilibrium value of potential function in the direction of perturbation.
Combining this observation with Proposition 3, we obtain that the minor population
faces a lower cost relative to the other population in the two side regimes; whereas both
populations face identical costs in the middle regime. Importantly, the relative value
of information is non-increasing in the size of its subscribed population (Theorem 3).
This result is based on the intuition that an individual traveler faces higher congestion
externality when more travelers have access to the same information, and hence make
their route choices according to the same strategy. Thus, an increase in the size of minor
population decreases the relative imbalance in congestion externality, thereby reducing
the advantage enjoyed by its travelers over the other population.
Our results can be easily specialized to a simpler information environment in which
one of the populations does not have an access to TIS (uninformed population). In this
case, we obtain that the equilibrium cost of the uninformed population is no less than
that of any other population regardless of the size vector. That is, having access to a
TIS always leads to a non-negative relative value of information in comparison to being
uninformed (Proposition 4).
We also extend our approach of pairwise comparison of populations to study how the
equilibrium outcome depends on population sizes in general. In particular, we characterize
a non-empty set of size vectors, where all the IICs can be dropped from the flow-based
optimization problem without changing its optimal value. The equilibrium edge load
vector is size-independent in this set (Proposition 5). Furthermore, Theorem 4 shows
that this set is comprised of all size vectors such that, in equilibrium, all travelers face
identical costs (socially fair) and no travelers have incentive to change TIS subscription
(stable). We say that such an outcome exhibits the stable social fairness property.
Theorem 4 is useful for evaluating the equilibrium adoption rate of each TIS when
travelers have the flexibility to choose their TIS subscription. Particularly, we consider a
two-stage game, in which travelers first choose their TIS, and then play the Bayesian rout-
ing game for the size vector induced from the first stage. A subgame perfect equilibrium
(SPE) of this game requires that travelers have no incentive to change their respective
TIS subscriptions, and that the routing strategies are chosen according to BWE of the
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subgame. Hence, any TIS with a positive adoption rate must incur the lowest expected
equilibrium cost among all TIS. We conclude that the set of equilibrium adoption rates in
SPE is indeed the set of size vectors for which the induced equilibrium outcome satisfies
the stable social fairness property.
Finally, we also identify a sufficient condition on the edge cost functions, under which
there is no inefficiency caused by selfish routing. When this condition is satisfied, we
obtain that equilibrium efficiency can be achieved in the stable socially fair set of size
vectors (Proposition 6).
1.2 Related Work
Congestion games. Well-known results in classical congestion games include their equiv-
alence with potential games (Rosenthal [1973], Monderer and Shapley [1996], Sandholm
[2001], and Sorin and Wan [2016]), analysis of network formation games as congestion
games (Gopalakrishnan et al. [2014], and Tardos and Wexler [2007]), and equilibrium in-
efficiency (Roughgarden and Tardos [2004], Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [1999], Correa
et al. [2007], Acemoglu and Ozdaglar [2007], and Nikolova and Stier-Moses [2014]). Some
models of congestion games in asymmetric information environments have been also re-
ported. For example, Heumen et al. [1996] and Facchini et al. [1997] showed that for
Bayesian congestion games with atomic players, a pure Nash equilibrium exists when the
game has a common prior, but may not exist otherwise. Milchtaich [1996], and Mavroni-
colas et al. [2007] have studied congestion games with player-specific cost functions. These
games can model both heterogeneous private information and heterogeneous preferences.
However, the existence of a potential function or even a pure Nash equilibrium is not
guaranteed. Since our game has non-atomic traveler populations, the existence of a pure
equilibrium is guaranteed. Furthermore, in our game, the heterogeneity in the expected
costs among populations arises only due to heterogeneous private beliefs, which are de-
rived from a common prior. This feature makes our game a weighted potential game
Sandholm [2001].
Effect of Traffic Information Systems. Prior work has studied the effects of TIS on
travelers’ departure time choices (Arnott et al. [1991], and Khan and Amin [2018]), and
on their route choices (Ben-Akiva et al. [1991], and Ben-Akiva et al. [1996]). In particular,
Mahmassani and Jayakrishnan [1991] conducted a simulation to study the effect of real-
time information on the performance of a congested traffic corridor, and concluded that
as more travelers receive information, the informed travelers gradually start facing higher
costs and their relative value of being informed diminishes. Our analysis, when applied
to the game with one uninformed population and other more informed ones, also leads to
similar conclusions. Our results are more general because they are applicable to routing
games with multiple heterogeneously informed populations with arbitrary TIS accuracies.
Another related work is by Acemoglu et al. [2018], which studies a congestion game
where travelers have different information sets about the available edges (routes). The
authors identify a sufficient and necessary condition on the network topology under which
receiving additional information does not increase the traveler costs. While their work
focuses on heterogeneous information about the network structure, we use a Bayesian
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approach to model the information heterogeneity resulting from the differences in TIS
access and accuracy.
Value of Information. In a classical paper, Blackwell et al. [1951] showed that for a
single decision maker, more informative signal always results in higher expected utility.
The Blackwell’s criterion for the comparison of information has been refined by Athey and
Levin [2017] and Persico [2000] for a class of decision making problems. In game-theoretic
settings, it is generally difficult to determine whether the value of information in equi-
librium for individual players and/or society is positive, zero or negative (see Hirshleifer
[1971], and Haenfler [2002]). However, the value of information is guaranteed to be pos-
itive when certain conditions are satisfied; see for example Neyman [1991], Bassan et al.
[2003], Gossner and Mertens [2001], and Lehrer and Rosenberg [2006]. Since travelers are
non-atomic players in our game, the relative value of information between any two TISs
is equivalent to the value of information for an individual traveler when her subscription
changes unilaterally. We give precise conditions on the population sizes under which the
value of information in our Bayesian routing game is positive, zero, or negative.
Equilibrium Adoption of Traffic Information Systems. In our model, the value of
information to TIS users (as well as non-users) depends on the size of the population with
access to information. Naturally, the notion of adoption rate becomes relevant, since if
it is possible for the non-users of a particular TIS to receive a greater value by adopting
it, then they will continue to do so until there is no longer a positive relative value in
adopting that TIS. Yin et al. [2003] explore market adoption for the environment with
single TIS provider. However, currently travelers have the choice of different competing
TISs that vary in their accuracy and other technological features. Thus, it is important
to consider not only the choice of adopting a TIS, but also which TIS the travelers choose
to follow in making their route choices. Our results provide a way to incorporate both
the adoption rate of a specific TIS as well as the effects of multiple competing TISs.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we motivate our analysis using a simple
routing game. Section 3 introduces our Bayesian routing game model; and in Section 4 we
show that this game is a weighted potential game; this property leads to characterizations
of the set of equilibrium strategy profiles and the set of route flows. In Section 5, we
analyze how the equilibrium structure and the relative value of information between any
two populations change with their sizes. In Section 6, we characterize equilibrium TIS
adoption rates for the case when travelers have the flexibility to choose or switch their
subscription. Concluding remarks are drawn in Section 7.
The complete proofs, along with supplementary results, are provided in the appendix.
2 Motivating Example
In this section, we motivate our analysis using a simple game of two asymmetrically
informed traveler populations routing over a network of two parallel routes, denoted r1
and r2. The network state s belongs to the set S = {a,n}, where the state a represents
an incident condition on r1, and the state n represents the nominal condition. The state
a occurs with probability p ∈ (0, 1). The network faces a unit size of demand (D = 1),
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which is comprised of two traveler populations: population 1 with size λ1 and population
2 with size λ2 = 1 − λ1. Each population i ∈ I = {1, 2} receives a signal ti of the state
from its TIS. Thus, the signal space of population i is T i = {a,n}. Assume for simplicity
that population 1 receives the correct state with probability 1 (i.e. complete information),
and population 2 receives signal a or n with probability 0.5, independent of the state (i.e.
no information). This information structure is common knowledge.
Let qi1(t
i) denote the traffic demand assigned to route r1 by population i when receiving
signal ti; the remaining demand (λi − qi1(ti)) is assigned to route r2. Since the signal t2
is independent of the state, we have q21(a) = q
2
1(n)
∆
= q21. A feasible demand assignment
must satisfy the constraints: 0 ≤ q11(t1) ≤ λ1 and 0 ≤ q21 ≤ λ2. For this example, we can
represent a routing strategy profile as q1 = (q
1
1(a), q
1
1(n), q
2
1). We denote the aggregate
route flow on r as fr. Again, for simplicity, consider that the cost of each route is an affine
function of the route flow, and both routes have identical free-flow travel time. That is,
the cost function of r1 is c
a
1(f1) = α
a
1f1 + b in state a, and c
n
1 (f1) = α
n
1 f1 + b in state n;
the cost function of r2 is c2(f2) = α2f2 + b. Furthermore, we assume that α
n
1 < α2 < α
a
1 .
Since population 1 has complete information, its travelers know the exact cost function
in both states. However, since population 2 travelers are uninformed, they make their
route choices based on the expected cost of each route, evaluated according to the prior
distribution of states.
This routing game with heterogeneously informed traveler populations admits a Bayesian
Wardrop equilibrium, as discussed in Section 3. Let q∗1 = (q
1∗
1 (a), q
1∗
1 (n), q
2∗
1 ) denote an
equilibrium strategy profile. Each population, given the signal it receives, can either as-
sign all its demand on one of the two routes, or splits on both routes. Thus, there are
33 = 27 possible cases. Our results can be used to study how the equilibrium strate-
gies and route flows change as the size of a population varies from 0 to 1. Detailed
analysis for this simple routing game and some interesting variants are available in Wu
et al. [2017]. Specifically, we find that there exists a threshold size of population 1,
0 < λ1 = α2
(
1
αn1 +α2
− 1
αa1+α2
)
< 1, such that the qualitative structure of equilibrium
routing strategies is different based on whether λ1 ∈ [0, λ1) or λ1 ∈ [λ1, 1].
In the first regime, i.e. when λ1 ∈ [0, λ1), the game admits a unique equilibrium:
q1∗1 (a) = 0, q
1∗
1 (n) = λ
1, and q2∗1 =
α2
α¯1+α2
− λ1 (1−p)(αn1 +α2)
α¯1+α2
, where α¯1 = pα
a
1 + (1 − p)αn1 .
This equilibrium regime corresponds to the following outcome: in state n (resp. state a),
population 1 assigns all its demand on route r1 (resp. route r2), and population 2 splits
its demand on both routes. The induced equilibrium flow on r1 is given by f
∗
1 = q
2∗
1 if
t1 = a, and f ∗1 = λ
1 + q2∗1 if t
1 = n.
On the other hand, in the second regime, i.e. when λ1 ∈ [λ1, 1], the equilibrium set
may not be singleton, and can be represented as follows: q1∗1 (a) = χ, q
1∗
1 (n) = λ
1 +
χ, and q2∗1 =
α2
αa1+α2
− χ, where max
{
0, λ1 − αa1
αa1+α2
}
≤ χ ≤ min
{
α2
αa1+α2
, λ1 − λ1
}
. Thus,
the equilibrium set is a one-dimensional interval for λ1 ∈ (λ1, 1), and a singleton set for
λ1 = λ1 or λ1 = 1. In this regime, both populations face identical expected route costs in
equilibrium. Consequently, each population splits its demand on both routes. Moreover,
the equilibrium route flow on each route is unique and independent of λ1: f ∗1 =
α2
αa1+α2
if
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t1 = a, and f ∗1 =
α2
αn1 +α2
if t1 = n.
Notice that when λ1 ∈ [0, λ1), we have q1∗1 (n) − q1∗1 (a) = λ1, i.e. population 1 shifts
all its demand to r2 when receiving the signal about the incident on r1. However, if
λ1 ∈ [λ1, 1], we have q1∗1 (n)− q1∗1 (a) = λ1 < λ1, i.e. the change in the received signal only
influences a part of travelers in population 1. One can say that the information impacts
the entire demand of population 1 in the first regime, but not in the second regime.
For any feasible λ = (λ1, λ2), we can calculate the equilibrium population costs, de-
noted Ci∗(λ). If λ1 ∈ [0, λ1), since population 1 takes r1 in state n and r2 in state a,
we can write C1∗(λ) = p · c2(1 − q2∗1 ) + (1 − p) · cn1 (λ1 + q2∗1 ). Population 2 uses both
routes, and thus C2∗(λ) = p · c2(1 − q2∗1 ) + (1 − p) · c2(1 − λ1 − q2∗1 ). It is easy to
check that C2∗(λ) − C1∗(λ) > 0, i.e. when the state information is only available to a
small fraction of travelers, the informed travelers have an advantage over the uninformed
ones. On the other hand, if the size of informed population exceeds the threshold λ1,
then C1∗(λ) = C2∗(λ). In this case, all travelers face identical cost in equilibrium, no
uninformed traveler has the incentive to become informed (and vice versa).
Finally, the equilibrium average cost is simply the average expected cost in equilibrium,
i.e. C∗(λ) ∆= λ1C1∗(λ)+λ2C2∗(λ). We can check that C∗(λ) monotonically decreases with
λ1 in the first regime, and attains a constant (minimum) value in the second regime. Thus,
increasing the size of informed population decreases the equilibrium average cost but only
when it is below λ1.
We illustrate the aforementioned results in Fig. 1 using the following parameters:
αn1 = 1, α
a
1 = 3, α2 = 2, b = 20, and p = 0.2. The costs are normalized by the socially
optimal cost, denoted Cso, which is the minimum cost achievable by a social planner with
complete information of the state.
3 Model
3.1 Environment
To generalize the simple routing game in Section 2, we consider a transportation network
modeled as a directed graph with a single origin-destination pair. Let E denote the set
of edges and R denote the set of routes. The finite set of network states, denoted S,
represents the set of possible network conditions, such as incidents, weather, etc. The
network state, denoted s, is randomly drawn by a fictitious player “Nature” from S
according to a distribution θ ∈ ∆(S), which determines the prior probability of each
state. For any edge e ∈ E and state s ∈ S, the state-dependent edge cost function cse(·)
is a positive, increasing, and differentiable function of the load through the edge e. Note
that the state can impact the edge costs in various ways.
The network serves a set of non-atomic travelers with a fixed total demand D. We
assume that each traveler is subscribed exclusively to one of the TIS in the set I =
{1, · · · , I}. We refer to the set of travelers subscribed to the TIS i ∈ I as population i.
All travelers within a population receive an identical signal from their TIS. Let λi denote
the ratio of population i’s size and the total demand D. We also consider degenerate
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Figure 1: Effects of varying population 1 size on equilibrium structure and costs: (a)
Population strategies, (b) Flow on route r1, (c) Population costs, and (d) Average cost.
situations when the sizes of one or more populations approach 0. Thus, a vector of
population sizes λ =
(
λ1, . . . , λI
)
is feasible if it satisfies the following constraints:∑
i∈I
λi = 1, (1a)
λi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I. (1b)
The size vector λ is considered as given in our analysis of equilibrium structure and costs
(Sections 4 and 5). In Section 6 we consider a more general situation where λ results from
the travelers’ TIS subscription choices.
Each TIS i ∈ I sends a noisy signal ti of the state to population i. The signal received
by each population determines its type (private information). We assume that the type
space of population i is a finite set, denoted as T i. Note that the type spaces T i and
the state space S need not be of the same size. Let t ∆= (t1, t2, . . . , tI) denote a type
profile, i.e. vector of signals received by the traveler populations; thus, t ∈ T ∆= ∏i∈I T i.
The joint probability distribution of the state s and the vector of signals t is denoted
pi ∈ ∆(S × T ), and it is the common prior of the game. The marginal distribution of
pi on states is consistent with the common prior, i.e.
∑
t∈T pi(s, t) = θ(s) for all s ∈ S.
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The conditional probability of type profiles t on the state s is given by p(t|s) = pi(s,t)
θ(s)
, i.e.
the joint distribution of signals received by the populations when the network state is s.
In our modeling environment, the signals of different TIS can be correlated, conditional
on the state. Each population i generates a belief about the state s and the other
populations’ types t−i based on the signal received from the information system i ∈ I.
We denote the population i’s belief as βi(s, t−i|ti) ∈ ∆(S × T −i).
The routing strategy of each population i ∈ I is a function of its type, denoted as
qi(ti) = (qir(t
i))r∈R. One way to describe the generation of routing strategies is that each
TIS i ∈ I sends a noisy signal ti of the state to its subscribed population, and the individ-
ual route choices of non-atomic travelers results in an aggregate routing strategy qi(ti).
An alternative viewpoint is that qi(ti) is a direct result of strategy route recommendations
sent by each TIS to its subscribed population. That is, each TIS i ∈ I routes travelers
in population i according to the function qi(ti). For our purpose, these two viewpoints
are equivalent in that given any population i ∈ I, and any type ti ∈ T i, the demand of
travelers on route r ∈ R is qir(ti).
We say that a routing strategy profile q
∆
= (qi)i∈I is feasible if it satisfies the following
constraints: ∑
r∈R
qir(t
i) = λiD, ∀ti ∈ T i, ∀i ∈ I, (2a)
qir(t
i) ≥ 0, ∀r ∈ R, ∀ti ∈ T i, ∀i ∈ I. (2b)
For a given size vector λ, let Qi(λ) denote the set of all feasible strategies of population
i. From (2a)-(2b), we know that the set of feasible strategy profiles Q(λ) ∆= ∏i∈I Qi(λ)
is a convex polytope.
3.2 Bayesian Routing Game
The Bayesian routing game for a fixed size vector λ can be defined as Γ(λ)
∆
= (I,S, T ,Q(λ), C, β),
where
- I: Set of populations, I = {1, 2, . . . , I}
- S: Set of states with prior distribution θ ∈ ∆(S)
- T = ∏i∈I T i: Set of population type profiles with element t = (ti)i∈I ∈ T
- Q(λ) = ∏i∈I Qi(λ): Set of feasible strategy profiles for a given size vector λ, with
element q = (qi)i∈I ∈ Q(λ)
- C = {cse (·)}e∈E,s∈S : Set of state-dependent edge cost functions
- β = (βi)i∈I : β
i ∈ ∆(S × T −i) is the population i’s belief on state s and other
populations’ types t−i
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All parameters including the common prior pi are common knowledge, except that pop-
ulations privately receive signals about the network state from their respective TIS. The
game is played as shown in Fig. 2.
•
Nature draws s
Population i receives ti
•interim stage
Population i ∈ I:
-obtains belief βi(s, t−i|ti)
-plays strategy qi
•ex post stage
Realize costs
Figure 2: Timing of the game Γ(λ).
For any i ∈ I and ti ∈ T i, the interim belief of population i is derived from the
common prior:
βi(s, t−i|ti) = pi(s, t
i, t−i)
Pr(ti)
, ∀s ∈ S, ∀t−i ∈ T −i, (3)
where Pr(ti) =
∑
s∈S
∑
t−i∈T −i pi(s, t
i, t−i). For a strategy profile q ∈ Q(λ), the induced
route flow is denoted f
∆
= (fr(t))r∈R,t∈T , where fr(t) is the aggregate flow assigned to the
route r ∈ R by populations with type profile t, i.e.
fr(t) =
∑
i∈I
qir(t
i), ∀r ∈ R, ∀t ∈ T . (4)
Note that the dependence of f on q is implicit and is dropped for notational convenience.
Again, for the strategy profile q ∈ Q(λ), we denote the induced edge load as w ∆=
(we(t))e∈E,t∈T , where we(t) is the aggregate load on the edge e assigned by populations
with type profile t:
we(t) =
∑
r3e
∑
i∈I
qir(t
i)
(4)
=
∑
r3e
fr(t), ∀e ∈ E , ∀t ∈ T . (5)
The corresponding cost of edge e ∈ E in state s ∈ S is cse(we(t)). Then, the cost of route
r ∈ R in state s ∈ S can be obtained as: csr(q(t)) =
∑
e∈r c
s
e(we(t)). Finally, the expected
cost of route r for population i ∈ I can be expressed as follows:
E[cr(q)|ti]
∑
s∈S
∑
t−i∈T −i
∑
e∈r
βi(s, t−i|ti)cse(we(ti, t−i))
(3)
=
∑
s∈S
∑
t−i∈T −i
∑
e∈r
pi(s, ti, t−i)
Pr(ti)
cse(we(t
i, t−i)), ∀r ∈ R, ∀ti ∈ T i, ∀i ∈ I, (6)
where we(t
i, t−i) is given by (5).
The equilibrium concept for our game Γ(λ) is Bayesian Wardrop equilibrium (BWE).
A strategy profile q∗ ∈ Q(λ) is a BWE if for any i ∈ I and any ti ∈ T i:
∀r ∈ R, qi∗r (ti) > 0 ⇒ E[cr(q∗)|ti] ≤ E[cr′(q∗)|ti], ∀r′ ∈ R. (7)
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That is, in a BWE, each population i with type ti assigns its demand only on routes that
have the smallest expected cost based on its interim belief βi(s, t−i|ti).
We define the equilibrium population cost, denoted Ci∗(λ), as the expected cost in-
curred by a traveler of a given population across all types and network states in equi-
librium: Ci∗(λ) ∆= 1
λiD
∑
ti∈T i Pr(t
i)
∑
r∈R E[cr(q∗)|ti]qi∗r (ti). In fact, from (7), we can
write:
Ci∗(λ)
(7)
=
1
λiD
∑
ti∈T i
Pr(ti)
(∑
r∈R
qi∗r (t
i)
)
min
r∈R
E[cr(q∗)|ti] (2a)=
∑
ti∈T i
Pr(ti) min
r∈R
E[cr(q∗)|ti].
(8)
Note that λi = 0 is a degenerate case for population i as its size approaches 0. In this case,
the cost Ci∗(λ) can be viewed as the expected cost faced by an individual (non-atomic)
traveler who subscribes to the TIS i.
Finally, the equilibrium average cost, denoted C∗(λ), is the average cost incurred by a
traveler of any population across all network states in equilibrium:
C∗(λ) ∆=
∑
i∈I
λiCi∗(λ) =
1
D
∑
i∈I
∑
ti∈T i
Pr(ti)
∑
r∈R
E[cr(q∗)|ti]qi∗r (ti). (9)
4 Equilibrium Characterization
In this section, we show that the game Γ(λ) is a weighted potential game. This property
enables us to express the sets of equilibrium strategy profiles and route flows as optimal
solution sets of certain convex optimization problems.
4.1 Equilibrium Strategy Profiles
Following Sandholm [2001], the game Γ(λ) is a weighted potential game if there exists
a continuously differentiable function Φ : Q(λ) → R and a set of positive, type-specific
weights {γ(ti)}ti∈T i,i∈I such that:
∂Φ(q(t))
∂qir(t
i)
= γ(ti)E[cr(q)|ti], ∀r ∈ R, ∀ti ∈ T i, ∀i ∈ I. (10)
Indeed, the game Γ(λ) is a weighted potential game with the function Φ defined as follows:
Φ (q)
∆
=
∑
s∈S
∑
e∈E
∑
t∈T
pi (s, t)
∫ ∑
r3e
∑
i∈I q
i
r(t
i)
0
cse(z)dz, (11)
and the positive type-specific weights are γ(ti)
∆
= Pr(ti) for any ti ∈ T i and i ∈ I, see
Lemma A.1.
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Using (4) and (5), Φ can be equivalently expressed as a function of the route flow f
or the edge load w induced by a strategy profile q ∈ Q(λ):
Φ̂(f)
∆
=
∑
s∈S
∑
e∈E
∑
t∈T
pi (s, t)
∫ ∑
r3e fr(t)
0
cse(z)dz (12)
̂
Φ(w)
∆
=
∑
s∈S
∑
e∈E
∑
t∈T
pi (s, t)
∫ we(t)
0
cse(z)dz. (13)
Thus, for any feasible strategy profile q ∈ Q(λ), we can write Φ(q) ≡ Φ̂(f) ≡
̂
Φ(w), where
f and w are the route flow and edge loads induced by the strategy profile q. Moreover,̂
Φ(w) is twice continuously differentiable and strictly convex in w, see Lemma A.2.
Our first result provides a characterization of the set of equilibrium strategy profiles:
Theorem 1. A strategy profile q ∈ Q(λ) is a BWE if and only if it is an optimal solution
of the following convex optimization problem:
min Φ(q)
s.t. q ∈ Q(λ), (OPT-Q)
where Q(λ) is the set of feasible strategy profiles. The equilibrium edge load vector w∗(λ)
is unique.
The existence of BWE follows directly from Theorem 1. For any size vector λ, we
denote the set of BWE for the game Γ(λ) as Q∗(λ). Importantly, since the equilibrium
edge load w∗(λ) is unique, the equilibrium population cost Ci∗(λ) for each population
i ∈ I in (8) and the equilibrium average cost C∗(λ) in (9) must also be unique for any λ.
Thus, the equilibria of Γ(λ) can be viewed as essentially unique. We denote the optimal
value of (OPT-Q), i.e. the value of the weighted potential function Φ(q) in equilibrium
as Ψ(λ).
The Lagrangian of (OPT-Q) that we use in proving Theorem 1 is given as follows:
L(q, µ, ν, λ) = Φ(q) +
∑
i∈I
∑
ti∈T i
µt
i
(
λiD −
∑
r∈R
qir(t
i)
)
−
∑
r∈R
∑
i∈I
∑
ti∈T i
νt
i
r q
i
r(t
i), (14)
where µ = (µt
i
)ti∈T i,i∈I and ν = (νt
i
r )r∈R,ti∈T i,i∈I are Lagrange multipliers associated with
the constraints (2a) and (2b), respectively. In fact, we show in Lemma A.4 that for any
BWE q∗ ∈ Q∗(λ), the optimal Lagrange multipliers µ∗ and ν∗ in (14) associated with q∗
are unique, and can be written as follows:
µt
i∗ = min
r∈R
Pr(ti)E[cr(q∗)|ti], ∀ti ∈ T i, ∀i ∈ I (15a)
νt
i∗
r = Pr(t
i)E[cr(q∗)|ti]− µti∗, ∀r ∈ R, ∀ti ∈ T i, ∀i ∈ I. (15b)
This result follows from the fact that (OPT-Q) satisfies the Linear Independence Con-
straint Qualification (LICQ) condition (Wachsmuth [2013]), which ensures the uniqueness
of Lagrange multipliers at the optimum of (OPT-Q); see Lemma A.3.
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Equations (15a) - (15b) connect the expected route costs for each type ti in equilibrium
with the Lagrange multipliers µt
i∗ and νt
i∗
r at the optimum of (OPT-Q), and will be used
in Section 5 for studying the relative ordering of equilibrium population costs.
4.2 Equilibrium Route Flows
Our main question of interest is how the set of BWE Q∗(λ), i.e. optimal solution set
of (OPT-Q), and more importantly, the equilibrium edge load w∗(λ), change with the
perturbations in the size vector λ. However, characterizing the effect of λ directly from
(OPT-Q) is not so straightforward. Recall that in the simple routing game in Section
2, the effects of perturbations in λ on the equilibrium route flow are relatively easier to
describe in comparison to the effects on the set of equilibrium strategy profiles, because the
equilibrium route flow remains fixed in a certain range of λ, whereas the set of equilibrium
strategy profiles do not. Thus, our approach involves first studying how λ effects the set
of equilibrium route flows. We show two results in this regard: (i) The set of feasible route
flows and the set of feasible strategy profiles that induces a particular route flow can be
both expressed as polytopes (Proposition 1); (ii) The set of equilibrium route flows is
the optimal solution set of a convex optimization problem (Proposition 2). These results
enable us to evaluate how the equilibrium edge load and population costs change with
perturbations in λ.
Let us start by introducing the following set of route flows:
F(λ) ∆= {f ∈ R|R|×|T | |f satisfies (17a)-(17d)}, (16)
where the constraints are given by:
fr(t
i, t−i)− fr(t˜i, t−i) = fr(ti, t˜−i)− fr(t˜i, t˜−i), ∀r ∈ R, ∀ti, t˜i ∈ T i, and ∀t−i, t˜−i ∈ T −i,∀i ∈ I,
(17a)∑
r∈R
fr(t) = D, ∀t ∈ T , (17b)
fr(t) ≥ 0, ∀r ∈ R, ∀t ∈ T , (17c)
D−
∑
r∈R
min
ti∈T i
fr(t
i, t−i) ≤ λiD, ∀t−i ∈ T −i, ∀i ∈ I. (17d)
The constraints (17a)-(17c) do not depend on the size vector λ and can be understood as
follows: (17a) captures the fact that the change in the flow through any route resulting
from change in the type of population i ∈ I does not depend on the particular types of
the remaining populations; (17b) ensures that all the demand D is routed through the
network; and (17c) guarantees that the demand assigned to any route is nonnegative.
On the other hand, the constraints in (17d) depend on the size vector λ, wherein the
size of each population i ∈ I, λi, appears linearly in the constraint corresponding to that
population. To further interpret (17d), we define an “impact of information” metric for
any given population as the maximum extent to which the signal received from its TIS
can influence the routing behavior of travelers within the population. Specifically, for any
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strategy profile q ∈ Q(λ) and population i ∈ I, we define the impact of information on
population i ∈ I as follows:
J i(q)
∆
= λiD−
∑
r∈R
min
ti∈T i
qir(t
i). (18)
Using (2a), we can re-write (18) as: J i(q) =
∑
r∈Rmaxti∈T i
(
qir(t̂
i)− qir(ti)
)
, where t̂i is
an arbitrary type in T i. That is, for each population i ∈ I, J i(q) is the summation over
all routes of the maximum difference between the demands assigned to each route r by
the type t̂i and any other type ti ∈ T i. Thus, we can say that the metric J i(q) evaluates
the impact of information on the population i’s strategy. We can alternatively express
this metric in terms of the flow f induced by q:
Ĵ i(f)
∆
= J i(q)
(4)
=
∑
r∈R
max
ti∈T i
(fr(t̂
i, t̂−i)− fr(ti, t̂−i)) (17b)= D−
∑
r∈R
min
ti∈T i
fr(t
i, t̂−i), (19)
where (t̂i, t̂−i) is any type profile in T .
Now the constraints (17d) can be equivalently stated as follows:
Ĵ i(f) ≤ λiD, ∀i ∈ I. (IIC)
These constraints ensure that the impact of signals on any population’s strategy is bounded
by its size. We will refer to them as information impact constraints (IIC). We use (IIC)
and (17d) interchangeably, and refer the constraint in (IIC) corresponding to population
i ∈ I as (IICi). Also, it is easy to see that for each i ∈ I, (IICi) can be written as a set
of affine inequalities:
D−
∑
r∈R
fr(t
i
r, t̂
−i) ≤ λiD, ∀ti1 ∈ T i, . . . ,∀ti|R| ∈ T i. (21)
Thus, F(λ), as defined in (16), is a convex polytope. The following proposition relates
the set of feasible strategy profiles and the induced route flows; see Fig. 3.
Figure 3: Map between Q(λ) and F(λ): F(λ) is the image of Q(λ) under the linear
transformation (4). The pre-image of any f ∈ F(λ) is given by the set of feasible strategy
profiles satisfying (22) and (23a)-(23c).
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Proposition 1. The set of feasible route flows is the convex polytope F(λ). Furthermore,
for a given route flow f ∈ F(λ), any feasible strategy profile q = (qir(ti))r∈R,ti∈T i,i∈I ∈
Q(λ) that induces f can be expressed as:
qir(t
i) = fr(t
i, t̂−i)− fr(t̂i, t̂−i) + χir, ∀r ∈ R, ∀ti ∈ T i, ∀i ∈ I, (22)
where t̂ =
(
t̂i
)
i∈I is any type profile in T , and (χir)r∈R,i∈I is an |R| × |I|-dimensional
vector satisfying the following constraints:∑
r∈R
χir = λ
iD, ∀i ∈ I, (23a)∑
i∈I
χir = fr(t̂), ∀r ∈ R, (23b)
χir ≥ max
ti∈T i
(
fr(t̂
i, t̂−i)− fr(ti, t̂−i)
)
, ∀r ∈ R, ∀i ∈ I. (23c)
The next proposition provides a characterization of the set of equilibrium route flows,
and is analogous to Theorem 1 which characterizes the set of equilibrium strategy profiles.
Proposition 2. A feasible route flow f ∈ F(λ) is an equilibrium route flow if and only
if f is an optimal solution of the following convex optimization problem:
min Φ̂(f)
s.t. f ∈ F(λ), (OPT-F)
where Φ̂(f) is given by (12), and F(λ) is the set of feasible route flow vectors, as defined
by (16).
We denote the set of equilibrium route flows f ∗ in the game Γ(λ) as F∗(λ). From
Theorem 1 and (11)-(13), we know that for any size vector λ, and any q∗ ∈ Q∗(λ),
f ∗ ∈ F∗(λ), we have
Ψ(λ) = Φ(q∗) = Φ̂(f ∗) =
̂
Φ(w∗(λ)). (24)
The Propositions 1 and 2 form the basis of our analysis of how the perturbations of size
vector effects the equilibrium structure and population costs.
5 Pairwise Comparison of Populations
In this section, we first analyze the effects of perturbations in the relative sizes of any two
populations on the equilibrium structure. Next, we study how the cost difference between
any two populations depends on the population sizes.
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5.1 Equilibrium Regimes
To study the effects of perturbations in the relative sizes of any two populations, we
employ the notion of directional perturbation of size vector λ. In particular, for any two
populations i and j, we consider the |I|-dimensional direction vector:
zij
∆
= (. . . 0 . . . , 1
|
i−th
, . . . 0 . . . , −1
|
j−th
, . . . 0 . . . ).
When λ is perturbed in the direction of zij, the size of population i (resp. population j)
increases (resp. decreases), and the sizes of the remaining populations do not change.
For any size vector λ and any two populations i and j, let the vector of the remain-
ing populations’ sizes be denoted λ−ij ∆=
(
λk
)
k∈I\{i,j}. The total size of the remaining
populations is |λ−ij| ∆= ∑k∈I\{i,j} λk. To avoid triviality in pairwise comparison, we only
consider the case when the sizes of both populations are strictly positive so that λ−ij
satisfies the constraint |λ−ij| < 1, and the range of the perturbations in the population
i’s size is (0, 1− |λ−ij|). We denote the set of admissible λ−ij as Λ−ij.
Now consider an optimization problem that is similar to (OPT-F), except that the
two constraints in the (IIC) set corresponding to the populations i and j are replaced by
a single constraint:
min Φ̂(f)
s.t. (17a), (17b), (17c), (IIC)\{i, j}, (IICij),
(OPT-F ij)
where the constraints (IIC)\{i, j} indicate that all but (IICi) and (IICj) from the original
set (IIC) are included, and the constraint (IICij) is defined as follows:
Ĵ i(f) + Ĵ j(f) ≤ (1− |λ−ij|)D. (IICij)
The constraint (IICij) ensures that the total impact of information on population i and j
does not exceed their total demand. We denote the set of optimal solutions for (OPT-F ij)
as F ij,†. Analogously to Theorem 1, we can show that any f ij,† ∈ F ij,† induces a unique
edge load wij,†, which can be obtained by (5); see Lemma B.1. Then, the optimal solution
set of (OPT-F ij) can be written as the following polytope:
F ij,† =
{
f
∣∣∣∣ f satisfies (17a), (17b), (17c), (IIC)\{i, j}, and (IICij),∑
r3e fr(t) = w
ij,†
e (t), ∀e ∈ E , ∀t ∈ T
}
. (25)
Note that both F ij,† and wij,† depend on λ−ij but do not depend on λi or λj.
Before proceeding further, we need to define two thresholds for the size of one of the
two perturbed populations (say, population i):
λi
∆
=
1
D
min
f ij,†∈Fij,†
{
Ĵ i(f ij,†)
}
(26a)
λ¯i
∆
=
1
D
max
f ij,†∈Fij,†
{(
1− |λ−ij|)D− Ĵ j(f ij,†)} , (26b)
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where Ĵ i(f ij,†) and Ĵ j(f ij,†) are the impact of information metrics for the population i
and j, respectively. It is easy to check that the thresholds λi and λ¯i satisfy 0 ≤ λi ≤
λ¯i ≤ 1 − |λ−ij| (see Lemma B.2), and that both (26a)-(26b) can be expressed as linear
programming problems, see (B.7)-(B.8). These two thresholds play a crucial role in our
subsequent analysis.
We are now ready to introduce the equilibrium regimes that are induced by the direc-
tional perturbation of size vector λ in the direction zij, i.e. when the populations i and j
undergo relative change in their sizes with fixed λ−ij ∈ Λ−ij. These regimes are defined
by the following sets:
Λij1
∆
= {(λi, λj, λ−ij) ∣∣λi ∈ (0, λi)}, (27a)
Λij2
∆
= {(λi, λj, λ−ij) ∣∣λi ∈ [λi, λ¯i] \ {0, 1− |λ−ij|}}, (27b)
Λij3
∆
=
{(
λi, λj, λ−ij
) ∣∣λi ∈ (λ¯i, 1− |λ−ij|)} . (27c)
We say that the population i (resp. population j) is a “minor population” in regime
Λij1 (resp. regime Λ
ij
3 ) because λ
i < λi (resp. λj < 1 − |λ−ij| − λ¯i). Moreover, neither
population is minor in regime Λij2 . In each of the three regimes, λ
i is in the admissible
range (0, 1− |λ−ij|). Note that degenerate situations are possible. In particular, if either
one or both of the thresholds λi and λ¯i take values in the set {0, 1−|λ−ij|}, then from the
regime definitions (27a)-(27c), the number of regimes are reduced to two (for example,
in the the simple routing game in Section 2) or even one regime (see Example B.2). The
following theorem describes the properties of equilibrium route flows in the regimes that
can be induced by directional perturbations in the size vector λ.
Theorem 2. For any two populations i, j ∈ I, and any given λ−ij ∈ Λ−ij, the set of
equilibrium route flows F∗(λ) when λ is in regime Λij1 or regime Λij3 can be expressed as
follows:
F∗(λ) =
{
arg min Φ̂(f)
∣∣∣∣ s.t. (17a), (17b), (17c), (IICij) and (IIC)\{j} if λ ∈ Λij1s.t. (17a), (17b), (17c), (IICij) and (IIC)\{i} if λ ∈ Λij3
}
(28)
In regime Λij1 (resp. regime Λ
ij
3 ), the constraint (IICi) (resp. (IICj)) is tight in equilibrium.
Additionally, in regime Λij2 , we have F∗(λ) ⊆ F ij,†.
Essentially, this result is based on how the impact of information on each perturbed
population compares with its size; i.e. whether or not the constraint (IICi) (resp. (IICj))
for the population i (resp. populatiom j) is tight in equilibrium. Moreover, since the
impact of information metric summed over both populations cannot exceed their total
demand, (IICij) must be satisfied in all regimes. Below we discuss the qualitative prop-
erties of equilibrium structure in the three regimes.
In the first side regime Λij1 , the constraint (IICi) is tight at optimum of (OPT-F).
This implies that the impact of information extends to the entire demand of the minor
population i. In fact, the threshold λi is the largest size of population i for which the
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impact of information on itself is fully attained. We can argue similarly for the other side
regime Λij3 , where population j is the minor population; i.e. (IICj) is tight at optimum of
(OPT-F) and (1− |λ−ij| − λ¯i) is the largest size of population j such that the impact of
information on itself is fully attained.
In contrast to the two side regimes, in the middle regime Λij2 , the sizes of both pop-
ulations i and j are above the threshold sizes λi and (1 − |λ−ij| − λ¯i), respectively. In
this regime, we can replace the constraints (IICi) and (IICj) in the optimization prob-
lem (OPT-F) by (IICij) without changing its optimal value, i.e. the optimal value of
(OPT-F ij) is equal to Ψ(λ). However, since the set F ij,† (as defined in (25)) contains
all route flows that attain the optimal value Ψ(λ) but may not necessarily satisfy the
constraints (IICi) and (IICj), the equilibrium route flow set F∗(λ) must be a subset of
F ij,†.
An implication of Theorem 2 is that in the two side regimes Λij1 and Λ
ij
3 , any equi-
librium strategy profile cannot be in the interior of the feasible set Q(λ). To see this,
recall from Proposition 1 that given an equilibrium route flow f ∗ ∈ F∗(λ), any equilibrium
strategy profile q∗ that induces f ∗ can be expressed as equation (22). Then from Theorem
2, based on the tightness of the constraint (IICi) or (IICj), we can conclude that:
In regime Λij1 : q
i∗
r (t
i) = f ∗r (t
i, t̂−i)− min
t˜i∈T i
f ∗r (t˜
i, t̂−i), ∀r ∈ R, ∀ti ∈ T i. (29a)
In regime Λij3 : q
j∗
r (t
j) = f ∗r (t
j, t̂−j)− min
t˜j∈T j
f ∗r (t˜
j, t̂−j), ∀r ∈ R, ∀tj ∈ T j, (29b)
where t̂−i (resp. t̂−j) is any vector of types in T −i (resp. T −j). Consequently, for each
route r ∈ R, there exists at least one ti ∈ T i (resp. tj ∈ T j) such that qi∗r (ti) = 0 (resp.
qj∗r (t
j) = 0) when the size vector λ is in the regime Λij1 (resp. Λ
ij
3 ). So we obtain that
q∗ is not in the interior of the feasible set of strategy profiles Q(λ) when λ lies in one
of the two side regimes. Furthermore, this result implies that in each side regime Λij1 or
Λij3 , given any route r ∈ R, there exists at least one TIS signal for the corresponding
minor population that triggers the population to shift its demand completely away from
the route r.
The general expressions of equilibrium routing strategies in (29a)-(29b) can be special-
ized to routing games with two heterogeneously informed populations and a parallel-route
network. Such a game admits a unique equilibrium strategy profile in the regimes Λ121
and Λ123 , see Corollary B.1.
Finally, thanks to Theorem 2, we can analyze the monotonicity of the value of potential
function at equilibrium Ψ(λ) with respect to perturbations of λ in the direction zij.
Proposition 3. For any two populations i, j ∈ I, and any given λ−ij ∈ Λ−ij, the func-
tion Ψ(λ) exhibits the following properties under directional perturbations of λ along the
direction zij:
• In regime Λij1 : Ψ(λ) monotonically decreases
• In regime Λij2 : Ψ(λ) does not change
• In regime Λij3 : Ψ(λ) monotonically increases.
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Furthermore, the equilibrium edge load vector w∗(λ) = wij,† if and only if λ ∈ Λij2 .
Following Theorem 2, in the side regime Λij1 (resp. Λ
ij
3 ), the set of route flows which
satisfy the constraints of the optimization problem in (28) increases (resp. decreases) as λ
is perturbed in the direction zij. Thus, the value of the potential function in equilibrium,
Ψ(λ), is non-increasing (resp. non-decreasing) in the direction zij. In fact, since the
constraint (IICi) (resp. (IICj)) is tight in equilibrium, one can argue that Ψ(λ) strictly
decreases (resp. increases) in the direction zij. In contrast, in the middle regime Λij2 , since
F∗(λ) ⊆ F ij,†, we can conclude that w∗(λ) = wij,†. Therefore, Ψ(λ) =
̂
Φ(wij,†), which
does not change when λ is perturbed in the direction zij.
The necessary and sufficient condition for the invariance of w∗(λ) under relative per-
turbations in the sizes of any two populations is a direct consequence of the monotonicity
of Ψ(λ) and the uniqueness of w∗(λ). Proposition 3 is useful in determining the relative
ordering of population costs in equilibrium, as discussed next.
5.2 Relative Value of Information
We now study the difference between the equilibrium costs of any two populations under
perturbations in their relative sizes. (Recall that equilibrium population costs in (8) are
unique, thanks to Theorem 1.) For any two populations i, j ∈ I and size vector λ, we
define the relative value of information as follows:
V ij∗(λ) ∆= Cj∗(λ)− Ci∗(λ). (30)
Thus, V ij∗(λ) is the expected travel cost saving that a traveler in population i enjoys over
a traveler in population j. Equivalently, V ij∗(λ) is the expected reduction in the cost
faced by an individual traveler when her subscription unilaterally changes from TIS i to
TIS j, while the TIS subscriptions of all other travelers remain unchanged. In particular,
for a given size vector λ, if V ij∗(λ) > 0 (resp. V ij∗(λ) < 0), a population i traveler faces
lower (resp. higher) cost in equilibrium than a population j traveler. Consequently, TIS i
can be viewed as a relatively more valuable (resp. less valuable) information system than
TIS j. Similarly, if V ij∗(λ) = 0, TIS i is said to be as valuable as TIS j.
It turns out that, for any given size vector λ, V ij∗(λ) is closely related to the sensitivity
of Ψ(λ) (i.e. the value of the potential function in equilibrium) to the perturbation in
the relative sizes of populations i and j. In particular, Lemma B.5 shows that Ψ(λ) is
convex in λ and is directionally differentiable. Furthermore, for any i, j ∈ I, V ij∗(λ) can
be expressed as follows:
V ij∗(λ) = − 1
D
∇zijΨ(λ), (31)
where ∇zijΨ(λ) ∆= lim→0+ Ψ(λ+z
ij)−Ψ(λ)

is the derivative of Ψ(λ) in the direction zij.
The proof of Lemma B.5 involves applying the results on sensitivity analysis of convex
optimization problems, as summarized in Lemmas B.3 and B.4; for a detailed background
on these technical results, we refer the reader to Fiacco [2009], Fiacco and Kyparisis [1986],
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and Rockafellar [1984]. By applying these results, we obtain that the derivative ∇zijΨ(λ)
is well-defined, and can be expressed in terms of µ∗, i.e. the Lagrange multiplies at the
optimum of (OPT-Q). Since µ∗ is unique, and can be written in (15a) (see Lemma A.4),
we can conclude that equation (31) holds. Our next theorem provides the qualitative
structure of relative value of information in the three regimes (27a)-(27c).
Theorem 3. For any two populations i, j ∈ I, and any λ−ij ∈ Λ−ij, the relative value of
information V ij∗(λ) satisfies the following properties:
• In regime Λij1 , V ij∗(λ) > 0
• In regime Λij2 , V ij∗(λ) = 0
• In regime Λij3 , V ij∗(λ) < 0.
Furthermore, V ij∗(λ) is non-increasing in the direction zij.
In other words, one population has advantage over another population if and only
if it is the minor population of the two. This result directly follows from Lemma B.5
and Proposition 3. The intuition behind the change in the relative value of information
in different regimes is based on the tightness of (IICi) or (IICj) in equilibrium. Recall
that the same argument is used in Theorem 2 for characterizing the set of equilibrium
route flows in different regimes. In particular, for the two side regimes, the constraint in
(IIC) corresponding to the minor population is tight because the information impacts its
entire demand. As a result, in equilibrium, the travelers in the minor population do not
choose the routes with a high expected cost based on the signal they receive from their
TIS; however, the travelers in the other population may still choose these routes. On the
other hand, in the middle regime, neither population has an advantage over the other
one because the information only partially impacts each population’s demand, and as a
result, both populations route their demand in a manner such that they face identical
cost in equilibrium.
Additionally, since V ij∗(λ) is non-increasing in the direction zij, we can conclude that
the travel cost saving that population i travelers enjoy over the population j is the highest
when population i has few travelers. Intuitively, in each side regime, the travelers in the
larger (non-minor) population face a higher congestion externality relative to the travelers
in the minor population, because all travelers within a population are routed according to
the same strategy. Naturally, the difference in the equilibrium costs due to the imbalance
in congestion externality decreases as the size of the minor population increases, and in
fact reduces to zero in the middle regime.
Furthermore, given any two populations i, j ∈ I and the sizes of all other populations
λ−ij being fixed, Theorem 3 provides a computational approach to compare the equilib-
rium costs of populations i and j for the full range of λi ∈ (0, 1− |λ−ij|) without explicit
computation of BWE or equilibrium route flows for each λi. This approach can be sum-
marized as follows: (i) Solve (OPT-F ij) to obtain an optimal solution f ij,†; (ii) Compute
wij,† by plugging f ij,† into (5); (iii) Obtain λi and λ¯i by solving (26a)-(26b); and (iv) Find
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the relative ordering of equilibrium costs of population i and j by checking which of the
three possible regimes the size vector λ belongs to.
Finally, we can specialize Theorem 3 to analyze situations when a population does
not have an access to a TIS, or chooses not to use it at all. Formally, we say that a
population j ∈ I is uninformed if its type is independent with the network state and
other populations’ types:
Pr(tj|s, t−j) = Pr(tj), ∀t−j ∈ T −j, ∀tj ∈ T j, ∀s ∈ S. (32)
Following (3), the uninformed population j’s interim belief can be written as follows:
βj(s, t−j|tj) (3)= pi(s, t
j, t−j)
Pr(tj)
=
Pr(tj|s, t−j) · Pr(s, t−j)
Pr(tj)
(32)
= Pr(s, t−j) =
∑
tj∈T j
pi(s, t−j, tj), ∀t−j ∈ T −j, ∀s ∈ S. (33)
That is, the interim belief βj(s, t−j|tj) is identical for any signal tj ∈ T j received by
population j, and is equal to the marginal probability of (s, t−j) calculated from the
common prior pi. Therefore, the uninformed population has no further information besides
the common knowledge. Our next result shows that the equilibrium cost of the uninformed
travelers is no less than the cost faced by travelers in any other population.
Proposition 4. Consider the game Γ(λ) in which population j is uninformed. Then,
for any size vector λ, the equilibrium cost of population j’s travelers Cj∗(λ) satisfies the
following conditions:
Cj∗(λ)
{
> Ci∗(λ), if λi ∈ (0, λi)
= Ci∗(λ), if λi ∈ [λi, 1− |λ−ij|), (34)
where the population i is any other population (i.e. i ∈ I \ {j}).
Indeed, if population j is uninformed, we can argue that its equilibrium routing strat-
egy qj∗(tj) must be identical for any tj ∈ T j. Consequently, from (18), the impact of
information metric for the population j is Ĵ j(qj∗) = 0, and perturbing the relative sizes
of population j and any other population i ∈ I \ {j} never results in a regime in which
population j is the minor population. Applying Theorem 3, we can conclude that the
equilibrium cost of population j cannot be less than that of any other population.
Example 1. To illustrate the results on equilibrium structure and relative value of infor-
mation, we consider a game with two populations on two parallel routes (r1 and r2) with
following parameters: θ(a) = 0.2, D = 10, cn1 (f1) = f1 + 15, c
a
1(f1) = 3f1 + 15, c2(f2) =
2f2 + 20. Types t
1 and t2 are independent conditional on the state, i.e. Pr(t1, t2|s) =
Pr(t1|s) · Pr(t2|s). Population 1 has 0.8 chance of getting accurate information of the
state, and population 2 has 0.6 chance, i.e. Pr(t1 = s|s) = 0.8, and Pr(t2 = s|s) = 0.6.
We illustrate the value of the potential function in equilibrium, equilibrium route flows
and costs in Fig. 4.
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Figure 4: Effects of varying population sizes: (a) Weighted potential function in equilib-
rium, (b) Equilibrium route flows on r1, and (c) Equilibrium population costs.
In this example, population 1 travelers receive more accurate state information than
population 2 travelers. However, population 1 faces a higher cost than population 2 when
its size is sufficiently large, i.e., when λ is in regime Λ123 ; see Figure 4c. This is due
to the fact that in regime Λ123 , the population 1’s advantage of receiving more accurate
information is dominated by the congestion externality it faces due to its relatively large
size, in comparison to population 2.
Additionally, we discuss three illustrative examples in the e-companion. Example B.1
shows that the regime Λ123 can be empty even when population 2 is not an uninformed
population. Thus, an uninformed population j is sufficient but not necessary for λ¯i =
1 − |λ−ij|. In Example B.2, we present a situation when only single regime exists in
equilibrium. Finally, in Example B.3, we consider the two-route game with two TIS of
same accuracy, i.e., travelers in these populations have an identical chance of receiving
correct state information. We compare two extreme cases for this game: (i) Types t1
and t2 are perfectly correlated, i.e., t1 = t2; and (ii) Types t1 and t2 are independent
conditional on the state. This example illustrates how the correlation among received
signals (or lack thereof) effects the equilibrium structure.
Our results so far focus on how equilibrium properties and population costs change
with the directional perturbation of the size vector λ. We emphasize that given any
i, j ∈ I, the thresholds λi and λ¯i, as defined in (26a)-(26b), depend on the sizes of
the remaining populations λ−ij, and the populations’ interim beliefs (βi)i∈I derived from
the common prior pi. Importantly, the qualitative structure of the equilibrium regimes
resulting from perturbations in the sizes of any two populations is applicable for any size
vector λ and any common prior. The main property that drives these results is that the
equilibrium regimes only depend on whether or not the impact of information on each
population is fully attained.
6 Equilibrium Outcome: General Results
In this section, we extend our approach of pairwise comparison of populations to study
how the equilibrium outcome depends on population sizes in general, and more broadly
23
how travelers choose TIS. In Section 6.1, we characterize a non-empty set of size vectors
for which the equilibrium edge load vector is size-independent. In Section 6.2, we study
the equilibrium adoption rates of TISs when travelers can choose their TIS subscription.
Finally, in Section 6.3, we identify a condition on the cost functions under which there is
no inefficiency due to selfish routing of heterogeneously informed traveler populations.
6.1 Size-Independence of Edge Load Vector
Our analysis in Section 5 showed that if perturbations in the relative sizes of any two
populations i, j ∈ I induce a middle regime Λij2 , then the equilibrium outcome in this
regime is independent of the sizes of the perturbed populations i and j. A natural question
to ask is whether this result can be generalized; i.e., can we find a set of size vectors for
which the equilibrium edge load does not depend on the size of any population? It turns
out that we can answer this question in the affirmative.
We now explicitly characterize the set of size vectors, denoted Λ†, for which the edge
load is size-independent. Using (24), we can argue that the optimal value of (OPT-F)
must be identical for all λ ∈ Λ†. Since (OPT-F) is a convex optimization problem, and
the (IIC) constraints are the only size-dependent constraints, we can equivalently view Λ†
as the set of size vectors for which all the IICs can be dropped from (OPT-F) without
changing its optimal value. Hence, for any λ ∈ Λ†, the optimal value of (OPT-F) is
identical to that of the following convex optimization problem:
min Φ̂(f)
s.t. (17a), (17b) and (17c).
(35)
Let us denote the optimal solution set of (35) as F †. Analogous to Theorem 1, one can
argue that any optimal solution f † ∈ F † induces a unique edge load w†, obtained from
(5). Thus, F † can be written as the convex polytope:
F † =
{
f
∣∣∣∣ f satisfies (17a), (17b) and (17c),∑
r3e fr(t) = w
†
e(t), ∀e ∈ E , ∀t ∈ T
}
. (36)
Furthermore, since any route flow in the set F † satisfies the constraints (17a)-(17c) –
but not necessarily (IIC) constraints – and also attains the optimal value of (OPT-F),
we must have that for any λ ∈ Λ†, F∗(λ) ⊆ F †. Therefore, for each λ ∈ Λ†, one must
have that the feasibility constraints (1a)-(1b) are satisfied; and additionally there exists
a f † ∈ F † that is an equilibrium route flow, i.e. at least one f † ∈ F † satisfies the (IIC)
constraints corresponding to λ. Thus, we can write:
Λ† ∆=
{
λ
∣∣∣∣ λ satisfies (1a) - (1b), and∃f † ∈ F † s.t. Ĵ i(f †) ≤ λiD, ∀i ∈ I
}
(37)
Before presenting our next result, we state two properties of Λ†: Firstly, Λ† is a non-empty
convex polytope (Lemma C.1). Secondly, Λ† is the set of size vectors that attain the
minimum value of the weighted potential function in equilibrium, i.e. Λ† = arg minλ Ψ(λ)
(Lemma C.2).
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Proposition 5. The equilibrium edge load vector w∗(λ) is size-independent, and is equal
to w† if and only if λ ∈ Λ†.
We have already argued that λ ∈ Λ† is sufficient to achieve the size independence of
the equilibrium edge load vector: If λ ∈ Λ†, then F∗(λ) ⊆ F † and since any f † ∈ F †
induces an identical edge load w†, we have w∗(λ) = w†. The necessity can be argued by
contradiction: If λ /∈ Λ†, we know from Lemma C.2 that Ψ(λ) must be larger than
̂
Φ(w†).
Hence, w∗(λ) cannot be equal to w†.
6.2 Adoption Rates under Choice of TIS
We now argue that our results on the relative value of information (Section 5), and the
size independence of the equilibrium edge load vector (Section 6.1) can be applied to
analyze the stable social fairness of the equilibrium outcome as well as travelers’ choice of
TIS subscription. We motivate the definition of stable social fairness by first introducing
the notion of social fairness.
We define a socially fair outcome as a situation in which all travelers face identical ex-
pected costs in equilibrium, regardless of their TIS subscriptions. Note that social fairness
refers to the equality of expected costs faced by travelers in non-degenerate populations.
Indeed, in the degenerate case when the size of travelers subscribed to a particular TIS
approaches zero, the corresponding population has no effect on the travelers’ expected
costs in equilibrium. Thus, in a socially fair outcome, a degenerate population may have
a different expected cost than the expected cost faced by non-degenerate populations.
Furthermore, we say that an equilibrium outcome of the routing game is stable socially
fair if the expected cost faced by any non-degenerate population is socially fair and lowest
among all populations, i.e. the cost faced by any degenerate population is no less than
the cost faced by a non-degenerate population:
λi > 0, ⇒ Ci∗(λ) = min
j∈I
Cj∗(λ), ∀i ∈ I. (38)
Therefore, no traveler has an ex ante incentive to switch her subscription of TIS. Recall
from Section 3 that in our model, each traveler is subscribed to a single TIS, and the
vector λ represents the resulting population size vector. This modeling feature reflects
the limitation of individual travelers in accessing more than one TIS or in switching to
another TIS. However, if the equilibrium outcome corresponding to a given size vector λ
is stable, any traveler’s incentive to remain subscribed to her TIS is not affected by the
presence of other TIS, or the equilibrium costs faced by other travelers.
We note that if all populations are non-degenerate, then social fairness is equivalent
to stable social fairness. However, if some populations are degenerate, then a socially fair
equilibrium outcome may not be stable socially fair. For example, consider the simple
routing game in Section 2 for the case when λ1 = 0 (i.e., all travelers belong to the
uninformed population 2). Social fairness is naturally achieved in this case since all
travelers are homogeneously informed. However, this outcome is not stable socially fair
because any informed traveler would face a strictly lower expected cost in equilibrium,
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and thus all uninformed travelers have an incentive to switch to TIS 1 if such a choice
were made available to them.
Our next theorem shows that all size vectors λ ∈ Λ† achieve stable social fairness in
equilibrium.
Theorem 4. An equilibrium outcome of Γ(λ) is stable socially fair if and only if λ ∈ Λ†.
The proof of this result utilizes two facts: (i) Ψ(λ) is a convex function, and for any
i, j ∈ I, its derivative in the direction zij is proportional to the difference in expected
equilibrium costs faced by the travelers in populations i and j; see Lemma B.5; (ii)
Λ† = arg minλ Ψ(λ); see Lemma C.2. For any λ ∈ Λ†, we can check that for each
pair i, j ∈ I, if both λi and λj are positive, then the directional derivative of Ψ(λ) in
the direction zij must be zero. Therefore, both populations i and j face identical costs
in equilibrium. However, for the limiting case when λi approaches 0 but λj > 0, the
derivative Ψ(λ) is non-negative in the direction zij, and thus the expected cost of a
population i traveler is no less than that faced by travelers in population j.
On the other hand, for any feasible λ /∈ Λ†, we can argue that there must exist
a direction zij in which the directional derivative of Ψ(λ) is negative, because Ψ(λ) is
convex and λ does not minimize Ψ(λ). If both λi and λj are positive, then the costs of
populations i and j are different, which violates the social fairness condition. However,
when λi approaches zero and λj > 0, the cost of a population i traveler is smaller than
that of the population j travelers, which is not stable socially fair.
Therefore, stable social fairness is attained if and only if λ ∈ Λ†.
We now consider the situation where travelers can choose to subscribe to any TIS. We
model this problem as a two-stage game Γ˜, defined as follows:
Stage 1: Travelers choose to subscribe to one TIS from the given set I. The induced size
vector is λ = (λi)i∈I , where λ
i is the fraction of travelers who choose TIS i.
Stage 2: Given the size vector λ, travelers in each population make route choices based
on the signal received from their TIS, i.e. travelers play the subgame Γ(λ).
Note that the size vector λ in the game Γ˜ is determined by the travelers’ TIS choices in
the first stage, as opposed to being a parameter in our analysis so far. A strategy profile
of the game Γ˜ is (λ, q), where a feasible λ satisfies (1a) - (1b), and q ∈ Q(λ) is a feasible
routing strategy profile.
A strategy profile, denoted
(
λ†, q†
)
, is a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the
game Γ˜, if it satisfies two conditions: Firstly, the strategy q† ∈ Q∗(λ) is a BWE in the
subgame Γ(λ) for each feasible λ, i.e. q† satisfies (7). Secondly, no traveler has the
incentive to change her TIS subscription in the first stage, i.e. λ† satisfies (38).
We note that the notion of stable social fairness is equivalent to the definition of SPE
in the context of this two stage game Γ˜. Hence, our results (Theorem 1 and Theorem
4) provide a characterization of the set of SPE in the game Γ˜, i.e. any λ† ∈ Λ† and any
q† ∈ Q∗(λ) constitute a SPE of the game. On the other hand, if the size vector λ /∈ Λ†,
then from Theorem (4), we know that (38) is violated, and hence such a λ cannot be
induced by travelers’ TIS subscription choices in SPE.
Our characterization of the set Λ† can be used to assess the adoption rate of each TIS
when travelers can choose from multiple available information systems. Indeed, for any
26
λ† ∈ Λ†, the support set of λ†, denoted I¯(λ†) ∆= {i ∈ I|λi† > 0}, represents the set of TIS
chosen by travelers in SPE, and the value λi† is the equilibrium adoption rate of each TIS
i ∈ I. Note that since Λ† is not necessarily a singleton set, the adoption rate of each TIS in
equilibrium is not unique. However, since Λ† is a convex set, the equilibrium adoption rate
of each TIS i ∈ I is in a continuous range, denoted [λi†min, λi†max], where λi†min = minλ†∈Λ† λi†
(resp. λi†max = maxλ†∈Λ†λ
i†) is the minimum (resp. maximum) equilibrium adoption rate.
Furthermore, since the set Λ† is determined by the heterogeneous information environment
created by all TIS, the equilibrium adoption rate of each TIS i is not only determined
by the accuracy of its signal (i.e. the distribution of the type ti given state s), but is
also related to the accuracy of other TIS, and the possible correlations between signals of
different TIS.
Finally, Theorem 4 can be used to assess whether or not a set of TIS can induce a
heterogeneous information environment. In particular, if |I¯(λ†)| = 1, then all travelers
choose to subscribe to a single TIS even though multiple TIS are available. Thus, the
resulting information environment is homogeneous; see Example B.2, where λ1 = 1 and
λ2 = 0 is the only size vector chosen in equilibrium. However, if |I¯(λ†)| > 1, then more
than one TIS are chosen, i.e., the heterogeneous information environment is sustained.
This is the case in Example 1, where the set Λ† is equal to Λ122 and both TIS are chosen
in equilibrium. Moreover, if TIS i /∈ I¯(λ†) for any λ† ∈ Λ†, then this TIS is redundant in
that it is not chosen in equilibrium even if it is available to the travelers.
6.3 Equilibrium Inefficiency
Finally, we relate our work to the well-known result of Roughgarden [2012] on inefficiency
due to selfish routing. We first define a benchmark to compare to the equilibrium average
cost as defined in (9). Given any feasible strategy profile q ∈ Q(λ), we denote the average
cost of all travelers as C(q)
∆
= 1
D
∑
i∈I
∑
ti∈T i Pr(t
i)
∑
r∈R E[cr(q)|ti]qir(ti). For any feasible
size vector λ, we define Copt(λ) as the minimum average cost over all feasible strategy
profiles:
Copt(λ)
∆
= min
q∈Q(λ)
C(q). (39)
Let qopt(λ) denote a feasible strategy that attains the minimum average cost. It is clear
that Copt(λ) is a trivial lower bound of C∗(λ) for any size vector λ.
The cost Copt(λ) can be seen as the average cost minimized by an “informationally
constrained” social planner who routes the demand of each population i ∈ I according to
qi,opt based on the population’s private signal, but not knowing the network state or signals
received by the other populations. Therefore, the benchmark Copt(λ) is the minimum
average cost in the same asymmetric information environment as the game Γ(λ), and the
inefficiency caused by the selfish routing can be evaluated by the ratio C∗(λ)/Copt(λ). By
straightforward extension of the well-known result in Roughgarden and Tardos [2004] on
the worst-case inefficiency in complete information congestion games, we obtain a tight
upper bound of C∗(λ)/Copt(λ) in our information environment for any size vector λ, see
Proposition C.1.
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Note that one can consider socially optimal cost, denoted Cso, as an alternative
benchmark to Copt(λ). As defined in (C.20), Cso is the minimum average cost achieved
by a fully informed social planner, i.e. the one who knows the true state and seeks
to minimize the average cost over all nature states. Clearly, given any size vector λ,
Cso ≤ Copt(λ) ≤ C∗(λ). This ratio C∗(λ)/Cso represents the combined loss of efficiency
due to selfish routing as well as information incompleteness about the network state. In
general, the ratio is hard to analyze due to the complexity of heterogeneous information
environment; see Roughgarden [2012] for conditions under which this ratio can be ana-
lyzed. However, since our focus is on evaluating the inefficiency due to selfish routing, we
simply adopt Copt(λ) as our benchmark.
The next proposition provides a condition on the edge cost functions for which there
is no inefficiency due to selfish routing, and consequently, one achieves a stable socially
fair, and efficient outcome when λ ∈ Λ†.
Proposition 6. For any s ∈ S and any e ∈ E, if the edge cost functions in game Γ(λ) can
be written as cse(we) = h
s
e(we) + b
s
e, where h
s
e is a homogeneous function with degree k > 1,
and {bse}e∈E,s∈S satisfies
∑
e∈r b
s
e = b
s, for any s ∈ S, and any r ∈ R, then C∗(λ)
Copt(λ)
= 1
for any size vector λ. Furthermore, the minimum of the equilibrium average cost C∗(λ)
is achieved in the set Λ†, i.e. Λ† = arg minλC
∗(λ).
The sufficient condition for this result restricts the edge cost functions to be comprised
of a homogeneous function and a constant; in addition, the free flow travel times of all
routes must be the same, although they can still be state-dependent. Under this condition,
the average cost of all travelers C(q) can be written as an affine transformation of the
weighted potential function Φ(q). From Theorem 1, we know that any BWE q∗ ∈ Q∗(λ)
minimizes the potential function Φ(q), and thus minimizes C(q) as well. Hence, C
∗(λ)
Copt(λ)
= 1
for any size vector λ. This result also implies that C∗(λ) in (9) is a linear transformation of
the value of the potential function in equilibrium, Ψ(λ). Recalling that Λ† = arg minλ Ψ(λ)
from Lemma C.2, we can conclude that the routing game attains the minimum of the
equilibrium average cost for any λ ∈ Λ†.
Example 2. Fig. 5a illustrates how C∗(λ) and Copt(λ) vary with λ for the routing game
considered in Example 1. In Fig. 5a, The size vector λ that minimizes C∗(λ) lies in
regime Λ121 . Fig. 5b presents the same plot for the game in which c
n
1 (f1) = f1 + 20,
ca1(f1) = 3f1 + 20; all other parameters remain unchanged. The sufficient condition in
Proposition 6 is satisfied in this case, so there is no inefficiency due to selfish routing.
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Figure 5: Equilibrium average cost C∗(λ) bounded by Copt(λ).
7 Concluding Remarks
In this article, we study the equilibrium route choices and costs in a heterogeneous in-
formation environment, in which each population receives a private signal from its traffic
information system (TIS). Each population maintains a belief about the unknown net-
work state and about the signals received by other traveler populations. We focus on
analyzing the equilibrium structure under perturbations of population sizes, the relative
value of information between any pair of populations, as well as the equilibrium adoption
rates when travelers can choose their TIS subscription.
The main ideas behind our analysis approach are: (i) Identification of qualitatively
distinct equilibrium regimes based on whether or not the impact of information is fully
attained; (ii) Sensitivity analysis of the weighted potential function in equilibrium with
respect to the population size vector; and (iii) Characterization of the set of size vectors
such that stable social fairness is attained so that travelers have no incentive to change
their TIS subscription. Our approach can be easily extended to games where the edge
costs are non-decreasing (rather than strictly increasing) functions of the edge loads. In
particular, such a game still admits a weighted potential function, although now the
essential uniqueness only applies to the equilibrium edge cost vector, rather than the edge
load vector. The qualitative properties of equilibrium structure, results about the relative
ordering of population costs, and conditions for stable social fairness can be extended as
well. However, the characterization of regime thresholds in this case is more complicated
from a computational viewpoint due to the non-uniqueness of edge load vector.
A future research question of interest is to analyze how the travelers’ expected cost and
TIS adoption rates change when one or more TIS providers make technological changes to
their service (for example, improving accuracy levels), or when a new TIS is introduced.
Addressing this problem would involve applying our results to evaluate the value of infor-
mation for each traveler population as well as the adoption rates in a stable socially fair
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outcome under the new information environment, and comparing them with that of the
current environment.
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A Proofs of statements in Section 4
Lemma A.1. Game Γ(λ) is a weighted potential game with the potential function Φ given
by (11), and the positive type-specific weight is γ(ti) = Pr(ti) for any ti ∈ T i and any
i ∈ I.
Proof of Lemma A.1. First note that Φ(q), as defined in (11), is a continuous and dif-
ferentiable function of the strategy profile q. To show that Φ(q) is a weighted potential
function of Γ(λ), we write the first order derivative of Φ(q) with respect to qir(t
i):
∂Φ(q)
∂qir(t
i)
=
∑
s∈S
∑
t−i∈T −i
pi(s, ti, t−i)
∑
e∈r
cse
(
we(t
i, t−i)
)
(6)
= Pr(ti)E[cr(q)|ti], ∀r ∈ R, ∀ti ∈ T i, ∀i ∈ I. (A.1)
Thus, Φ(q) satisfies (10) with γ(ti) = Pr(ti) for any ti ∈ T i and any i ∈ I. 
Lemma A.2.
̂
Φ(w) is twice continuously differentiable and strictly convex in w.
Proof of Lemma A.2. Since each cse(we(t)) is differentiable in we(t), we know that
̂
Φ(w)
is twice differentiable with respect to w. The first order partial derivative of
̂
Φ(w) with
respect to we(t) can be written as:
∂
̂
Φ(w)
∂we(t)
=
∑
s∈S pi(s, t)c
s
e (we (t)) for any e ∈ E , and any
t ∈ T . Also, the second order derivative of
̂
Φ(w) can be written as follows:
∂2
̂
Φ(w)
∂we(t)∂we′ (t
′)
=
{ ∑
s∈S pi (s, t)
dcse(we(t))
dwe(t)
, if e = e
′
and t = t
′
,
0, otherwise,
∀e, e′ ∈ E , ∀t, t′ ∈ T .
Since for any e ∈ E and any s ∈ S, cse(we) is increasing in we,
∑
s∈S pi (s, t)
dcse(we(t))
dwe(t)
> 0.
Thus, the Hessian matrix of
̂
Φ(w) has positive elements on the diagonal and 0 in all other
entries, i.e. it is positive definite. Therefore,
̂
Φ(w) is strictly convex in w. 
Proof of Theorem 1. We first show that any minimum of (OPT-Q) is a BWE. For any
optimal solution q, there must exist µ and ν such that (q, µ, ν) satisfies the following
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions:
∂L
∂qir(t
i)
=
∂Φ
∂qir(t
i)
− µti − νtir = 0, ∀r ∈ R, ∀ti ∈ T i, ∀i ∈ I, (KKT.1)
νt
i
r q
i
r(t
i) = 0, ∀r ∈ R, ∀ti ∈ T i, ∀i ∈ I, (KKT.2)
νt
i
r ≥ 0, ∀r ∈ R, ∀ti ∈ T i, ∀i ∈ I. (KKT.3)
Using (A.1) and (KKT.1), we have ∂Φ(q)
∂qir(t
i)
= Pr(ti)E[cr(q)|ti] = µti + νtir for any r ∈ R,
and ti ∈ T i, i ∈ I. From (KKT.2), we see that for any r ∈ R, and ti ∈ T i, i ∈ I,
if qir(t
i) > 0, the corresponding Lagrange multiplier νt
i
r = 0, and Pr(t
i)E[cr(q)|ti] = µti .
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However, if qir(t
i) = 0, then Pr(ti)E[cr(q)|ti] = µti + νtir ≥ µti . Thus, for any r ∈ R, and
ti ∈ T i, i ∈ I:
qir(t
i) > 0 ⇒ Pr(ti)E[cr(q)|ti] = µti ≤ µti + νtir′ = Pr(ti)E[cr′ (q)|ti], ∀r
′ ∈ R.
From (7), we conclude that an optimal solution of (OPT-Q) is a BWE.
Next, we show that any BWE q∗ of the game Γ(λ) is an optimal solution of (OPT-Q).
Consider a pair of Lagrange multipliers µ¯ (resp. ν¯)) corresponding to the constraints
(4a) (resp. (4b)), where µ¯t
i
= minr∈R Pr(ti)E[cr(q∗)|ti] and ν¯tir = Pr(ti)E[cr(q∗)|ti] − µ¯ti .
We can easily check that (KKT.1) and (KKT.3) are satisfied by (q∗, µ¯, ν¯). Since q∗ is a
BWE, we know from (7) that for a route r ∈ R, and ti ∈ T i, i ∈ I, if qi∗r (ti) > 0, then
E[cr(q∗)|ti] = minr∈R E[cr(q∗)|ti] and consequently ν¯tir = Pr(ti)E[cr(q∗)|ti]− µ¯ti = 0. This
implies that (KKT.2) is also satisfied by (q∗, µ¯, ν¯). Noting that Φ(q) ≡
̂
Φ(w), where the
induced edge load w is linear in q (see (5)), and that
̂
Φ(w) is strictly convex in w (Lemma
A.2), we conclude that Φ(q) is a convex function of q. Furthermore, since Q(λ) is a convex
polytope, (OPT-Q) is a convex problem. Thus, KKT conditions are also sufficient for
optimality, and any BWE q∗ is an optimal solution of (OPT-Q).
Finally, for any λ, we can use equations (5) and (13) to re-express (OPT-Q) as an
optimization problem whose solution gives an equilibrium edge load w∗(λ):
min
w,q
̂
Φ(w)
s.t. we(t) =
∑
r3e
∑
i∈I
qir(t
i), ∀t ∈ T , ∀e ∈ E ,
q ∈ Q(λ).
(A.2)
Clearly, the feasible set of the above problem is a convex polytope. From Lemma A.2,̂
Φ(w) is strictly convex in w. Therefore, the equilibrium edge load w∗(λ) is unique. 
Lemma A.3. (Theorem 2 in Wachsmuth [2013]) The Lagrange multiplies µ∗ and ν∗
associated with any q∗ ∈ Q∗(λ) at the optimum of (OPT-Q) are unique if and only if the
LICQ condition is satisfied in that the gradients of the set of tight constraints in (2a)-(2b)
at the optimum are linearly independent.
Lemma A.4. The Lagrange multipliers µ∗ and ν∗ at the optimum of (OPT-Q) are
unique, and can be written in (15a)-(15b).
Proof of Lemma A.4. Let the set of constraints that are tight at optimum of (OPT-Q)
in (2b) be denoted as B. Assume for the sake of contradiction that LICQ does not
hold, i.e. the set of equality constraints (2a) and the elements in the set B are linearly
dependent. Now, note that the constraint sets (2a) and (2b) are each comprised of linearly
independent affine functions. Hence, there must exist a type t¯i such that the gradient
of the corresponding equality constraint (i.e.
∑
r∈R q
i∗
r (t¯
i) = λiD) is linearly dependent
with the elements in the set B, which implies that qi∗r (t¯i) = 0,∀r ∈ R. However, this
violates the equality constraint in (2a) as
∑
r∈R q
i∗
r (t¯
i) = λiD 6= 0, and we arrive at a
contradiction.
34
Since LICQ holds, for any equilibrium strategy profile q∗ ∈ Q∗(λ), the corresponding
µ∗ and ν∗ must be unique. Following the proof of Theorem 1, we conclude that for any
q∗ ∈ Q∗(λ), (q∗, µ∗, ν∗) satisfies the KKT conditions, and µti∗ and νti∗r can be written as
(15a) and (15b), respectively.
Finally, noting that the equilibrium edge load is unique (Theorem 1), µ∗ and ν∗ in
(15a)-(15b) are thus unique in equilibrium. 
Proof of Proposition 1. We proceed in three steps: In Step I, we show that any feasible
route flow satisfies constraints (17a)-(17d). In Step II, we show that for any f ∈ F(λ)
(i.e. f satisfies constraints (17a)-(17d)), the set of feasible strategy profiles q that induce
it can be expressed as (22). Finally, in Step III, we prove that such set of q in (22) is
non-empty. Step II and Step III together show that any f ∈ F(λ) can be induced by at
least one feasible strategy, and thus is a feasible route flow.
Step I: We show that any q ∈ Q(λ) induces a route flow f that satisfies (17a)-(17d).
From (4), we obtain that f satisfies (17a):
fr(t
i, t−i)− fr(t˜i, t−i) =qir(ti) +
∑
j∈I\{i}
qjr(t
j)− qir(t˜i)−
∑
j∈I\{i}
qjr(t
j)
=qir(t
i) +
∑
j∈I\{i}
qjr(t˜
j)− qir(t˜i)−
∑
j∈I\{i}
qjr(t˜
j)
=fr(t
i, t˜−i)− fr(t˜i, t˜−i), ∀ti, t˜i ∈ T i, ∀t−i, t˜−i ∈ T −i, and ∀i ∈ I.
From (2a) and (2b), we can directly conclude that f must also satisfy (17b) and (17c).
Additionally, we can write:
D−
∑
r∈R
min
ti∈T i
fr(t
i, t−i)
(4)
= D−
∑
r∈R
∑
j∈I\{i}
qjr(t
j)−
∑
r∈R
min
ti∈T i
qir(t
i)
(2a)
= D−
∑
j∈I\{i}
λjD−
∑
r∈R
min
ti∈T i
qir(t
i)
(1a)
= λiD−
∑
r∈R
min
ti∈T i
qir(t
i)
(2b)
≤ λiD, ∀t−i ∈ T −i, ∀i ∈ I.
Therefore, f satisfies (17d). Thus, any feasible route flow must satisfy (17a)-(17d).
Step II: Next, we show that for any route flow f ∈ F(λ) (i.e. f that satisfies con-
straints (17a)-(17d)), the set of feasible strategies that induce f can be characterized by
(22). For any route r ∈ R, the linear system of equations (4) has ∏i∈I |T i| equations in∑
i∈I |T i| variables. Note that for any given t̂ =
(
t̂i
)
i∈I ∈ T , the following equations are
linearly independent: ∑
i∈I
qir(t̂
i) = fr(t̂),
qir(t
i) +
∑
j∈I\{i}
qjr(t̂
j) = fr(t
i, t̂−i), ∀ti ∈ T i \ {t̂i}, ∀i ∈ I.
(A.3)
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We then show that given any t ∈ T , ∑i∈I qir(ti) = fr(t) is a linear combination of the
equations in (A.3). Following (17a), we can write:
∑
i∈I
fr(t
i, t̂−i)− (|I| − 1)fr(t̂) = fr(t1, t̂−1) + fr(t2, t̂−2) +
|I|∑
i=3
fr(t
i, t̂−i)− (|I| − 1)fr(t̂)
(17a)
= fr(t
1, t2, t̂−1−2) + fr(t̂) +
|I|∑
i=3
fr(t
i, t̂−i)− (|I| − 1)fr(t̂)
= fr(t
1, t2, t̂−1−2) +
|I|∑
i=3
fr(t
i, t̂−i)− (|I| − 2)fr(t̂),
where t̂−1−2 is the vector (t̂3, · · · , t̂|I|). We apply the same procedure iteratively for another
|I| − 2 times, and obtain:∑
i∈I
fr(t
i, t̂−i)− (|I| − 1)fr(t̂) = fr(t), ∀t ∈ T . (A.4)
Now for any r ∈ R and t ∈ T , we can write:
∑
i∈I
qir(t
i) =
∑
i∈I
qir(ti) + ∑
j∈I\{i}
qjr(t̂
j)
− (|I| − 1)∑
i∈I
qir(t̂
i)
(A.3)
=
∑
i∈I
fr(t
i, t̂−i)− (|I| − 1)fr(t̂) (A.4)= fr(t).
Thus, for any r ∈ R, the linear system (4) is comprised of ∑i∈I |T i| variables, and
any constraint can indeed be expressed as a linear combination of
∑
i∈I |T i| − |I| + 1
independent equations in (A.3). From the rank-nullity theorem, we conclude that the
dimension of null space of this linear map is |I| − 1. Then, for any r ∈ R, any i ∈ I,
setting qir(t̂
i) = χir, any solution of (4) can be expressed as (22), where t̂ ∈ T is an
arbitrary type profile. Additionally,
∑
i∈I χ
i
r =
∑
i∈I q
i
r(t̂
i) = fr(t̂). Thus, χ satisfies
(23b), i.e. for each r ∈ R, out of the |I| variables in {χir}i∈I , |I| − 1 are free, and the
remaining one is obtained from (23b). We can conclude that the strategy profile q as
defined in (22) induces the route flow f . It remains to be shown that if q is a feasible
strategy profile, χ must satisfy (23a) and (23c) as well. Since q satisfies (2a), we obtain
that χ satisfies (23a):
λiD
(2a)
=
∑
r∈R
qir(t
i)
(22)
=
∑
r∈R
(
fr(t
i, t̂−i)− fr(t̂i, t̂−i) + χir
) (17b)
=
∑
r∈R
χir, ∀i ∈ I.
Additionally, from (2b), 0 ≤ qir(ti)
(22)
= fr(t
i, t̂−i) − fr(t̂i, t̂−i) + χir for any r ∈ R and any
ti ∈ T i. Thus, χir ≥ maxti∈T i
{
fr(t̂
i, t̂−i)− fr(ti, t̂−i)
}
, i.e. χ satisfies (23c).
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Step III: Finally, we show that the set of χ satisfying (23) is non-empty, i.e., any
f ∈ F(λ) can be induced by at least one feasible strategy profile q. Consider any f ∈ F(λ),
we explicitly construct the following χ, and show that such χ satisfies (23):
χir = γr ·
(
λiD−
∑
r∈R
max
ti∈T i
(
fr(t̂)− fr(ti, t̂−i)
))
+ max
ti∈T i
(
fr(t̂)− fr(ti, t̂−i)
)
, ∀r ∈ R, ∀i ∈ I,
(A.5)
where t̂ is any arbitrary type profile, and
γr =
{
fr(t̂)−
∑
i∈I maxti∈T i(fr(t̂)−fr(ti,t̂−i))∑
r∈R[fr(t̂)−
∑
i∈I maxti∈T i(fr(t̂)−fr(ti,t̂−i))]
, if
∑
r∈R
[
fr(t̂)−
∑
i∈I maxti∈T i
(
fr(t̂)− fr(ti, t̂−i)
)] 6= 0,
0, otherwise.
First, we check that the (χir)r∈R,i∈I as defined in (A.5) satisfies (23c). Note that
γr ≥ 0. To see this, since for any t ∈ T ,
∑
i∈I fr(t
i, t̂−i) − (|I| − 1)fr(t̂) (A.4)= fr(t) ≥ 0,
we know that mint∈T
∑
i∈I fr(t
i, t̂−i) − (|I| − 1)fr(t̂) = mint∈T fr(t) ≥ 0. Thus, for any
r ∈ R, we obtain:
fr(t̂)−
∑
i∈I
max
ti∈T i
(
fr(t̂)− fr(ti, t̂−i)
)
= (1− |I|)fr(t̂) +
∑
i∈I
min
ti∈T i
fr(t
i, t̂−i)
= min
t∈T
∑
i∈I
fr(t
i, t̂−i)− (|I| − 1)fr(t̂) = min
t∈T
fr(t) ≥ 0. (A.6)
Hence, we can conclude that γr ≥ 0.
Next, we can write:
λiD−
∑
r∈R
max
ti∈T i
(
fr(t̂)− fr(ti, t̂−i)
) (17b)
= λiD−
(
D−
∑
r∈R
min
ti∈T i
fr(t
i, t̂−i)
)
(17d)
≥ 0
Using the above inequality, we obtain that χir as considered in (A.5) satisfies (23c).
Second, we check that χir satisfies (23a). If
∑
r∈R
[
fr(t̂)−
∑
i∈I maxti∈T i
(
fr(t̂)− fr(ti, t̂−i)
)]
>
0, we have:∑
r∈R
χir =
∑
r∈R
γr ·
(
λiD−
∑
r∈R
max
ti∈T i
(
fr(t̂)− fr(ti, t̂−i)
))
+
∑
r∈R
max
ti∈T i
(
fr(t̂)− fr(ti, t̂−i)
)
=
(
λiD−
∑
r∈R
max
ti∈T i
(
fr(t̂)− fr(ti, t̂−i)
))
+
∑
r∈R
max
ti∈T i
(
fr(t̂)− fr(ti, t̂−i)
)
= λiD.
On the other hand, if
∑
r∈R
[
fr(t̂)−
∑
i∈I maxti∈T i
(
fr(t̂)− fr(ti, t̂−i)
)]
= 0, we obtain
that:
0 =
∑
r∈R
[
fr(t̂)−
∑
i∈I
max
ti∈T i
(
fr(t̂)− fr(ti, t̂−i)
)] (17b)
= D−
∑
i∈I
(∑
r∈R
max
ti∈T i
(
fr(t̂)− fr(ti, t̂−i)
))
(17d)
≥ D−
∑
i∈I
λiD
(1a)
= 0,
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which implies that for any i ∈ I, ∑r∈Rmaxti∈T i (fr(t̂)− fr(ti, t̂−i)) = λiD. Since in this
case, γr = 0, we can conclude that
∑
r∈R χ
i
r =
∑
r∈Rmaxti∈T i
(
fr(t̂)− fr(ti, t̂−i)
)
= λiD,
i.e. χ satisfies (23a).
Finally, χir also satisfies (23b). If
∑
r∈R
[
fr(t̂)−
∑
i∈I maxti∈T i
(
fr(t̂)− fr(ti, t̂−i)
)]
>
0, we have:∑
i∈I
χir = γr ·
∑
i∈I
(
λiD−
∑
r∈R
max
ti∈T i
(
fr(t̂)− fr(ti, t̂−i)
))
+
∑
i∈I
max
ti∈T i
(
fr(t̂)− fr(ti, t̂−i)
)
(1a)
= γr ·
(
D−
∑
i∈I
∑
r∈R
max
ti∈T i
(
fr(t̂)− fr(ti, t̂−i)
))
+
∑
i∈I
max
ti∈T i
(
fr(t̂)− fr(ti, t̂−i)
)
(17b)
= γr ·
(∑
r∈R
[
fr(t̂)−
∑
i∈I
max
ti∈T i
(
fr(t̂)− fr(ti, t̂−i)
)])
+
∑
i∈I
max
ti∈T i
(
fr(t̂)− fr(ti, t̂−i)
)
= fr(t̂)−
∑
i∈I
max
ti∈T i
(
fr(t̂)− fr(ti, t̂−i)
)
+
∑
i∈I
max
ti∈T i
(
fr(t̂)− fr(ti, t̂−i)
)
= fr(t̂).
If
∑
r∈R
[
fr(t̂)−
∑
i∈I maxti∈T i
(
fr(t̂)− fr(ti, t̂−i)
)]
= 0, then we have:
0 =
∑
r∈R
[
fr(t̂)−
∑
i∈I
max
ti∈T i
(
fr(t̂)− fr(ti, t̂−i)
)] (A.6)
=
∑
r∈R
min
t∈T
fr(t) ≥ 0,
which implies that for any r ∈ R, mint∈T fr(t) = 0. In this case, γr = 0, and thus∑
i∈I χ
i
r =
∑
i∈I maxti∈T i
(
fr(t̂)− fr(ti, t̂−i)
) (A.6)
= fr(t) − mint∈T fr(t) = fr(t), i.e. χ
satisfies (23b).
Therefore, if f satisfies (17a)-(17d), we can conclude that the χ in (A.5) satisfies (23),
i.e. the set of χ satisfying (23) is non-empty. We already showed in Step II that q as
defined in (22) with parameter χ satisfying (23) is a feasible strategy profile, and q induces
f . Therefore, if f satisfies (17a)-(17d), there exists a feasible q that induces f , i.e. any
f ∈ F(λ) is a feasible route flow.
In summary, we have shown that any feasible route flow satisfies (17) (Step I); For
any f that satisfies (17), the set of feasible strategy profiles that induce f can be written
in (22)-(23) (Step II); Such set is non-empty, and hence f is feasible (Step III). We can
thus conclude that the set of feasible route flows is F(λ), and the set of feasible strategy
profiles, which induce f is characterized by (22)-(23). 
Proof of Proposition 2. From Proposition 1, we know that the set of feasible route flows is
the set F(λ) characterized by (17a)-(17d). Additionally, the weighted potential function
in (11) can be equivalently written as a function of f in (12). Therefore, the minimum
of (OPT-F) is equal to that in (OPT-Q), and the set of optimal solutions is the set of
equilibrium route flows. 
B Proof of statements in Section 5
Lemma B.1. The route flows f ij,† ∈ F ij,† induce a unique edge load wij,†.
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Proof of Lemma B.1 Following (5) and (13), any edge load wij,† induced by route flows
in F ij,† (which we defined as optimal solution set of (OPT-F ij)) is an optimal solution of
the following optimization problem:
min
w
̂
Φ(w),
s.t. we(t) =
∑
r3e
fr(t), ∀t ∈ T , ∀e ∈ E ,
f satisfies (17a), (17b), (17c), (IIC)\{i, j}, (IICij).
The constraints (17a), (17b), (17c) are linear constraints. Following from (21), constraints
(IIC)\{i, j}, (IICij) are each equivalent to a set of linear constraints. Additionally, w is a
linear function of f , thus the feasible set of w in this optimization problem must also be
a convex polytope. From Lemma A.2,
̂
Φ(w) is a strictly convex function in w. Therefore,
the optimal solution wij,† is unique. 
Lemma B.2. 0 ≤ λi ≤ λ¯i ≤ 1− |λ−ij|.
Proof of Lemma B.2. First, we show that both thresholds λi and λ¯i belong to the interval
[0, 1− |λ−ij|]. Since λi is attainable on the set F ij,†, there exists f˜ ij,† ∈ F ij,† such that:
λi =
1
D
Ĵ i(f˜ ij,†)
(19)
=
1
D
(
D−
∑
r∈R
min
ti∈T i
f˜ ij,†r
(
ti, t−i
)) ≥ 1
D
(
D−
∑
r∈R
f˜ ij,†r
(
t̂i, t−i
)) (17b)
= 0.
Similarly, we can check that λ¯i ≤ 1− |λ−ij|.
Additionally, we know for any f ij,† ∈ F ij,†:
λ¯i
(26b)
≥ 1
D
{(
1− |λ−ij|)D− Ĵ j(f ij,†)} (IICij)≥ 1
D
Ĵ i(f ij,†)
(26a)
≥ λi.
Therefore, 0 ≤ λi ≤ λ¯i ≤ 1− |λ−ij|. 
For any two populations i, j ∈ I, we can re-write (26a) for computing the threshold
λi as follows:
min y
s.t. D−
∑
r∈R
fr(t
i
r, t̂
−i) ≤ y ·D, ∀ti1 ∈ T i, . . . ,∀ti|R| ∈ T i,
f ij,† ∈ F ij,†,
(B.7)
where F ij,† is the polytope defined in (25). Therefore, (B.7) is a linear programming.
Analogously, the threshold λ¯i defined in (26b) is the optimal value of the following linear
programming:
max y
s.t. − |λ−ij|D +
∑
r∈R
fr(t
j
r, t̂
−j) ≥ y ·D, ∀tj1 ∈ T j, . . .∀tj|R| ∈ T j,
f ij,† ∈ F ij,†.
(B.8)
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Proof of Theorem 2.
[
Regime Λij1
]
: First, we show by contradiction that the constraint
(IICi) is tight for any equilibrium route flow. Assume that for a given λ ∈ Λij1 , there
exists an equilibrium route flow f ∗ such that (IICi) is not tight. From Proposition 2, we
know that f ∗ is an optimal solution of (OPT-F). Since (OPT-F) is a convex optimization
problem, f ∗ is still a minimizer of Φ̂(f) if we drop the constraint (IICi). Additionally, the
constraints (IICi) and (IICj) implies that f
∗ must also satisfy (IICij). Thus, such f ∗ is
an optimal solution of the following problem:
min
f
Φ̂(f)
s.t. (17a), (17b), (17c), (IICij), and (IIC)\{i}.
(B.9)
Moreover, the threshold λ¯i defined in (26b) is attained by a route flow, say f˜ ij,†, in the
set F ij,†. Thus, we can write:
1− |λ−ij| − 1
D
Ĵ j(f˜ ij,†) = λ¯i
(Lemma B.2)
≥ λi (27a)> λi.
Rearranging, we obtain: 1
D
Ĵ j(f˜ ij,†) < 1− |λ−ij| − λi = λj, and so such f˜ ij,† also satisfies
(IICj). Since f˜
ij,† is an optimal solution of (25), which minimizes the same objective
function as (B.9) but without the constraint (IICj), we thus know that f˜
ij,† is also an
optimal solution in (B.9). Since the induced edge load is unique, we can conclude that the
edge load induced by f ∗ must be identical to that induced by f˜ ij,†, which is wij,†. Then,
from (25), we have f ∗ ∈ F ij,†. Therefore, from (26a), we can write λi ≤ 1
D
Ĵ i(f ∗). Since
we assumed that (IICi) is not binding in equilibrium, we obtain:
1
D
Ĵ i(f ∗) < λi < λi ≤
1
D
Ĵ i(f ∗), which is a contradiction. Thus, (IICi) must be tight in equilibrium for any λ in
regime Λij1 .
Finally, following the tightness of (IICi) at optimum of (OPT-F), by rearranging the
constraint (IICij) in (28), we have:
Ĵ j(f ∗) ≤ (1− |λ−ij|)D− Ĵ i(f ∗) = λjD. (B.10)
Thus, (IICj) is guaranteed to hold in Regime Λ
ij
1 given the constraint (IICij) and the
fact that (IICi) is tight at the optimum of (OPT-F). Hence, (IICj) can be dropped in
(OPT-F) without changing the optimal solution set.[
Regime Λij3
]
: Analogous to the proof given for regime Λij1 , we can argue that con-
straint (IICj) is tight in any equilibrium for any λ in regime Λ
ij
3 . By imposing constraint
(IICij), (IICi) can be dropped from the constraint set in (OPT-F) without changing the
optimal solution set.[
Regime Λij2
]
: To study this regime, we need two additional thresholds λi and λ¯i which
we define as follows:
λi
∆
=
1
D
max
f ij,†∈Fij,†
{
Ĵ i(f ij,†)
}
, (B.11a)
λ¯i
∆
=
1
D
min
f ij,†∈Fij,†
{(
1− |λ−ij|)D− Ĵ j(f ij,†)} . (B.11b)
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From (26a) and (26b), we can check that λi ≤ λi, and λ¯i ≤ λ¯i.
For any λi ∈ [λi, λi], we argue that F∗(λ) ⊆ F ij,†. Since the set F ij,† as defined by (25)
is a bounded polytope, and λi (resp. λi) is the minimum (resp. maximum) value of the
continuous function Ĵ i(f ij,†) on F ij,†, we know from the mean value theorem that there
exists a f˜ ij,† ∈ F ij,† satisfying: λi = 1
D
Ĵ i(f˜ ij,†). Similar to the argument in (B.10), such
f˜ ij,† also satisfies constraint (IICj). Therefore, f˜ ij,† satisfies all the constraints in (17), and
minimizes Φ̂(f). So f˜ ij,† is an equilibrium route flow, which implies that F∗(λ)∩F ij,† 6= ∅.
Since the equilibrium edge load vector is unique, and the edge load induced by f˜ ij,† is
wij,†, we must have w∗(λ) = wij,†. Furthermore, from (25), F ij,† is a superset of all feasible
route flows that can induce wij,†. Therefore, F∗(λ) ⊆ F ij,† for any λi ∈ [λi, λi]. Similarly,
we can argue that for any λi ∈ [λ¯i, λ¯i], F∗(λ) ⊆ F ij,†.
To prove that F∗(λ) ⊆ F ij,† for any λ in regime Λij2 , we need to argue two cases λi ≥ λ¯i
and λi < λ¯i separately:
Case 1: λi ≥ λ¯i. Since [λi, λ¯i] ⊆ [λi, λi] ∪ [λ¯i, λ¯i], thus F∗(λ) ⊆ F ij,† for any λ in
regime Λij2 .
Case 2. λi < λ¯i: Consider any λi ∈ (λi, λ¯i), we can check that any f ij,† ∈ F ij,†
satisfies the constraint (IICi):
1
D
Ĵ i(f ij,†)
(B.11a)
≤ λi < λi. Additionally, since λi < λ¯i
(B.11b)
≤
1 − |λ−ij| − 1
D
Ĵ j(f ij,†), we know that 1
D
Ĵ j(f ij,†) < 1 − |λ−ij| − λi = λj, i.e. f ij,† also
satisfies the constraint (IICj). Therefore, any f
ij,† ∈ F ij,† is an equilibrium route flow,
i.e. F∗(λ) = F ij,† for any λi ∈ (λi, λ¯i). Combined with the fact that F∗(λ) ⊆ F ij,† for
any λ ∈ [λi, λi] ∪ [λ¯i, λ¯i], we can conclude that F∗(λ) ⊆ F ij,† for any λ in regime Λij2 . 
Corollary B.1. If the game Γ(λ) has a parallel-route network, then the equilibrium route
flow f ∗ is unique. Moreover, if there are two populations, then the equilibrium strategy
profile is unique in regime Λ121 or Λ
12
3 , and can be written as follows:
In regime Λij1 : q
1∗
r (t
1) = f ∗r (t
1, t̂2)− min
t̂1∈T 1
f ∗r (t̂
1, t̂2), ∀r ∈ R, ∀t1 ∈ T 1, (B.12a)
q2∗r (t
2) = min
t̂1∈T 1
f ∗r (t̂
1, t2), ∀r ∈ R, ∀t2 ∈ T 2, (B.12b)
In regime Λij3 : q
1∗
r (t
1) = min
t̂2∈T 2
f ∗r (t
1, t̂2), ∀r ∈ R, ∀t1 ∈ T 1, (B.12c)
q2∗r (t
2) = f ∗r (t̂
1, t2)− min
t̂2∈T 2
f ∗r (t̂
1, t̂2), ∀r ∈ R, ∀t2 ∈ T 2, (B.12d)
where
(
t̂1, t̂2
)
is any type profile.
Proof of Corollary B.1. Given a parallel route network, we immediately obtain the unique-
ness of f ∗ from Theorem 1. Then from Proposition 1, any strategy profile that can induce
f ∗ can be expressed as in (22). In regime Λ121 , we know from Theorem 2 that the constraint
(IIC1) is tight in equilibrium. Therefore, from (23a) and (23c), we obtain:
λ1D
(23a)
=
∑
r∈R
χ1r
(23c)
≥
∑
r∈R
max
t1∈T 1
(
f ∗r (t̂
1, t̂2)− f ∗r (t1, t̂2)
) (19)
= Ĵ1(f ∗) = λ1D.
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Thus, (23c) is tight for any r ∈ R, i.e. χ1r = maxt1∈T 1
(
f ∗r (t̂
1, t̂2)− f ∗r (t1, t̂2)
)
. Addition-
ally, from (23a), χ2r = mint1∈T 1 f
∗
r (t
1, t̂2). Thus, χ as defined in (23) is unique. Following
(22), we can obtain the unique q∗ as defined in (B.12a)-(B.12b). Analogously, we can
argue that the equilibrium strategy profile is also unique in regime Λ123 , and is written as
in (B.12c)-(B.12d). 
Proof of Proposition 3.
[
Regime Λij1
]
: Consider any population size vector λ ∈ Λij1 , there
exists a sufficiently small  > 0 such that λ
′
= λ + zij ∈ Λij1 , i.e. λi′ = λi +  > λi,
λj
′
= λj −  < λj, and the sizes of all other populations remain unchanged. Consider
any equilibrium route flow f ∗(λ) ∈ F∗(λ) and any f ∗(λ′) ∈ F∗(λ′). We know from
Theorem 2 that constraint (IICi) is tight in equilibrium, and thus f
∗(λ) and f ∗(λ
′
) satisfy:
1
D
Ĵ i(f ∗(λ)) = λi < λi
′
= 1
D
Ĵ i(f ∗(λ
′
)). Consequently, any equilibrium route flow f ∗(λ)
for size vector λ is in the feasible domain of (28) for size vector λ
′
, but f ∗(λ) /∈ F∗(λ′),
because Ĵ i (f ∗(λ)) = λi < λi
′
, i.e. the constraint (IICi) is satisfied, but not tight. Since
f ∗(λ
′
) ∈ F∗(λ′), we must have Ψ(λ′) = Φ̂(f ∗(λ′)) < Φ̂(f ∗(λ)) = Ψ(λ).
Additionally, from (24), we know that Ψ(λ
′
) =
̂
Φ(w∗(λ
′
)) <
̂
Φ(w∗(λ)) = Ψ(λ). Thus,
the unique equilibrium edge load w∗(λ) necessarily changes in the direction zij in regime
Λij1 .[
Regime Λij2
]
: From Theorem 2, F∗(λ) ⊆ F ij,† for any λ ∈ Λij2 . Since the equilibrium
edge load is unique, we know w∗(λ) = wij,†. From (24) we can conclude that Ψ(λ) =̂
Φ(wij,†). Thus, Ψ(λ) as well as w∗(λ) remain fixed in regime Λij2 .[
Regime Λij3
]
: Following similar argument in regime Λij1 , we conclude that Ψ(λ) mono-
tonically increases in the direction zij in regime Λij3 . As a result, w
∗(λ) changes when λ
is perturbed in the direction zij in regime Λij3 . 
Lemma B.3. (Corollary 2.2 in Fiacco and Kyparisis [1986], page 102) The value of the
potential function in equilibrium, Ψ(λ), is convex with respect to λ if in (OPT-Q), Φ(q)
is convex in q, and the constraints are affine in q and λ.
Lemma B.4. (Proposition 6 in Fiacco [2009], page 3469) If in (OPT-Q), the objective
function Φ(q) is convex and continuously differentiable in q and λ, and additionally the
set of BWE q∗ and the set of Lagrange multiplies µ∗, ν∗ are nonempty and bounded,
then Ψ(λ) is continuous and directionally differentiable in λ. Furthermore, for any given
i, j ∈ I, the directional derivative of Ψ(λ) in the direction zij can be expressed as follows:
∇zijΨ(λ) = min
q∗∈Q∗(λ)
max
(µ∗,ν∗)
∈(M(q∗),N(q∗))
∇λL(q∗, µ∗, ν∗, λ)zij, (B.13)
where M(q∗) and N(q∗) are the sets of Lagrange multipliers µ∗ and ν∗ in (14) associated
with the BWE q∗ ∈ Q∗(λ).
Lemma B.5. The value of the weighted potential function in equilibrium, Ψ(λ) as defined
in (24), is convex and directionally differentiable in λ. For any i, j ∈ I, the derivative of
Ψ(λ) in the direction zij, ∇zijΨ(λ) = −D · V ij∗(λ).
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Proof of Lemma B.5 Since in (OPT-Q), the weighted potential function Φ(q) is convex
in q, and the constraints (2a)-(2b) are affine in q and λ, from Lemma B.3, we know that
the optimal value of the potential function Ψ(λ) is convex in λ.
We next check that the conditions in Lemma B.4 are satisfied in (OPT-Q): (1) The
potential function Φ(q) is continuously differentiable in q, and constraints (2a)-(2b) are
linear in q and λ; (2) The optimal solution set Q∗(λ) is non-empty and bounded (Theorem
1). The Lagrange multipliers at the optimum of (OPT-Q) are unique, and bounded
(Lemma A.4). Therefore, from Lemma B.4, we know that Ψ(λ) is differentiable in the
direction zij, and ∇zijΨ(λ) can be expressed as:
∇zijΨ(λ) (B.13)= min
q∗∈Q∗(λ)
max
(µ∗,ν∗)
∈(M(q∗),N(q∗))
∇λL(q∗, µ∗, ν∗, λ) · zij
(14)
= min
q∗∈Q∗(λ)
max
(µ∗,ν∗)
∈(M(q∗),N(q∗))
(∑
ti∈T i
µ∗t
i −
∑
tj∈T j
µ∗t
j
)
·D.
From Lemma A.4, since both µ∗ and ν∗ are unique in equilibrium, ∇zijΨ(λ) can be
simplified as:
∇zijΨ(λ) =
(∑
ti∈T i
µ∗t
i −
∑
tj∈T j
µ∗t
j
)
D
(15a)
=
(∑
ti∈T i
min
r∈R
Pr(ti)E[cr(q∗)|ti]−
∑
tj∈T j
min
r∈R
Pr(tj)E[cr(q∗)|tj]
)
D
(8)
=
(
Ci∗(λ)− Cj∗(λ))D (30)= −V ij∗(λ) ·D. (B.14)

Proof of Theorem 3. We prove (i) and (ii) in sequence:
(i): We know from Proposition 3 that in direction zij, Ψ(λ) decreases in regime Λij1 ,
does not change in regime Λij2 and increases in regime Λ
ij
3 . Following Lemma B.5, we
directly obtain that V ij∗(λ) > 0 in regime Λij1 , V
ij∗(λ) = 0 in regime Λij2 , and V
ij∗(λ) < 0
in regime Λij3 .
(ii): We have shown in Lemma B.5 that Ψ(λ) is convex in λ. Hence, for any i, j ∈ I,
the directional derivative ∇zijΨ(λ) is non-decreasing in direction zij. From (31), we can
conclude that V ij∗(λ) is non-increasing in direction zij. 
Proof of Proposition 4. Since the interim belief of population j, βj(s, t−j|tj) in (33) is
independent with type tj, the equilibrium strategy of the uninformed population qj∗(tj)
must be identical across all tj ∈ T j. Following (18) and (19), the impact of information
metric J j(q∗) = Ĵ j(f ∗) = 0 for any q∗ ∈ Q∗(λ), f ∗ ∈ F∗(λ) and any λ. For the sake
of contradiction, we assume that the regime Λij3 is non-empty. From Theorem 2, we
know that the constraint (IICj) must be tight in equilibrium when λ is in regime Λ
ij
3 .
However, since Ĵ j(f ∗) = 0 for any λ, the constraint (IICj) is tight only when λj = 0,
i.e. λi = 1 − |λ−ij|. This implies that the regime Λij3 is indeed empty. Thus, there are
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at most two regimes Λij1 and Λ
ij
2 . Following Proposition 3, we can conclude that C
i∗ and
Cj∗ satisfy (34). 
Example B.1. We consider the game with two populations on two parallel routes (r1 and
r2) with the following cost functions: c
n
1 (f1) = f1+15, c
a
1(f1) = 3f1+15, c2(f2) = 20f2+30.
The prior distribution θ, the total demand D, and the information environment are the
same as that in Example 1. Although both populations receive the accurate signal of the
state with positive probability, we have λ¯1 = 1 as the impact of information on population
2 is zero. Since the free flow travel time on r2 is much higher than that on r1, population
2 travelers exclusively uses r1 regardless of the received signal, see Fig. 6.
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Figure 6: Effects of varying population sizes for Example B.1: (a) Equilibrium route flows
on r1; (b) Equilibrium population costs.
Example B.2. Consider a game with two populations on two parallel routes (r1 and
r2). There are two states: {s1, s2}, each state is realized with probability 0.5. The cost
functions are: cs11 (f1) = f1 + 10, c
s2
1 (f1) = f1 + 1, c
s1
2 (f2) = f2 + 1, c
s2
2 (f2) = f2 + 10.
Population 1 is completely informed, and population 2 is uninformed. The total demand
is D = 1. We now obtain that λ1 = λ¯1 = 1; thus, regimes Λ122 and Λ
12
3 are empty sets,
and population 1 has strictly lower expected cost than population 2 for any λ1 ∈ (0, 1), see
Fig. 7.
Example B.3. We consider the game with two populations on two parallel routes (r1
and r2) with the same cost functions, prior distribution θ and total demand D as that in
Example 1. Both populations 1 and 2 have 0.75 chance of getting accurate information
about the state, i.e. Pr(ti = s|s) = 0.75 for any i ∈ I and any s ∈ S. In Fig. 8, we
illustrate the equilibrium population costs in two cases: (i) Types t1 and t2 are perfectly
correlated, i.e. t1 = t2; (ii) Types t1 and t2 are independent conditional on the state, i.e.
Pr(t1, t2|s) = Pr(t1|s) · Pr(t2|s).
44
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
λ
1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
f
∗ 1
/D f
∗
1 (n, t
2)/D
f ∗1 (a, t
2)/D
(a)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
λ
1
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
C
i∗
/
C
so C1∗
C2∗
Cso
(b)
Figure 7: Effects of varying population sizes for Example B.2: (a) Equilibrium route flows
on r1; (b) Equilibrium population costs.
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Figure 8: Effects of varying population sizes on equilibrium population costs for Example
B.3: (a) Perfectly correlated types; (b) Conditional independent types.
Note that case (i) can be viewed as a single-population game. This is because when t1
and t2 are perfectly correlated, there is no information asymmetry among travelers. Thus,
λ1 has no impact on the equilibrium outcome, and λ1 = 0, λ¯1 = 1.
However, case (ii) is not equivalent to a single-population game. Although both pop-
ulations have identical chance of getting accurate information about the state, there is
information heterogeneity among travelers of the two populations, i.e. travelers in one
population do not know the signals received by travelers in the other population, and thus
the equilibrium outcome changes with the size λ1.
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C Proof of Statements in Section 6
Lemma C.1. The set Λ† is a non-empty convex polytope.
Proof of Lemma C.1 We first show that Λ† is a non-empty set. For any f † ∈ F †, we
consider a size vector λ defined as follows:
λi =
1
D
Ĵ i(f †) +
1
|I|
(
1−
∑
k∈I
1
D
Ĵk(f †)
)
, ∀i ∈ I. (C.15)
It is easy to check that λ so defined satisfies (1a). Additionally, we can check that:
∑
k∈I
1
D
Ĵk(f †)
(19)
=
1
D
∑
k∈I
(
D−
∑
r∈R
min
tk∈T k
f †r (t
k, t̂−k)
)
(17b)
=
1
D
∑
r∈R
∑
k∈I
(
f †r (t̂)− min
tk∈T−k
f †r (t
k, t̂−k)
)
=
1
D
∑
r∈R
max
t∈T
∑
k∈I
(
f †r (t̂)− f †r (tk, t̂−k)
)
=
1
D
∑
r∈R
max
t∈T
(
|I| · f †r (t̂)−
∑
k∈I
f †r (t
k, t̂−k)
)
(A.4)
=
1
D
∑
r∈R
max
t∈T
(
f †r (t̂)− f †r (t)
) (17c)≤ 1
D
∑
r∈R
f †r (t̂)
(17b)
= 1.
Thus, λ in (C.15) satisfies (IICi) for any i ∈ I. From (19), it is also clear that Ĵ i(f †) ≥ 0
for any i ∈ I. Thus λi satisfies (1b). Hence, λ that we constructed satisfies the conditions
in (37). We can conclude that the set Λ† is non-empty.
We next prove that the set Λ† is a convex polytope. In fact, the definition in (37) can
be equivalently written as follows:
Λ† = Projλ
{
(λ, f)
∣∣∣∣ Ĵ i(f) ≤ λiD, ∀i ∈ I,f ∈ F †, λ satisfies (1a) - (1b)
}
, (C.16)
where the operator Projλ(·) gives the orthogonal projection of the vector (λ, f) onto the
sub-space of λ. To see this we can check that any feasible λ belongs to Λ† (as defined in
(37)) if and only if we can find a route flow f † ∈ F † such that the pair (λ, f †) satisfies
the constraints in (C.16).
We know that the set F † is a convex polytope, and constraints (1a)-(1b) are linear
constraints. Thus, the set of (λ, f) satisfying constraints in (C.16) is a convex polytope,
and the orthogonal projection image Λ† is also a convex polytope. 
Lemma C.2. For any λ ∈ Λ†, the set of equilibrium route flows F∗(λ) ⊆ F †. Further-
more, the set Λ† attains the minimum of Ψ(λ), i.e. Λ† = arg minλ Ψ(λ).
Proof of Lemma C.2 Firstly, we prove that for any λ ∈ Λ†, F∗(λ) ⊆ F †. From the
definition of Λ† in (37), we know that for any λ ∈ Λ†, there exists at least one route flow
f † ∈ F † satisfying the constraints in (OPT-F), and hence such f † is a feasible solution
of the optimization problem (OPT-F); thus Φ̂(f †) ≥ Ψ(λ). Additionally, since f † is an
optimal solution of (35), which has the same objective function as (OPT-F) but without
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the constraints (IIC), we conclude that Φ̂(f †) ≤ Ψ(λ) for any feasible λ (including λ ∈ Λ†).
Thus, Ψ(λ) = Φ̂(f †), and f † is an equilibrium route flow. Analogous to the argument
in proof of Theorem 1, the equilibrium edge load equals to w†. Since the set F † in (36)
contains all route flows such that the induced edge load is w†, we can conclude that the
set of equilibrium route flow F∗(λ) ⊆ F † for any λ ∈ Λ†.
Now, we prove that Λ† = arg minλ Ψ(λ). We have argued in the first part of the proof
that for any f † ∈ F †, Φ̂(f †) ≤ Ψ(λ) for any feasible λ; and since for any λ ∈ Λ†, F∗(λ) ⊆
F †, we have Ψ(λ) = Φ̂(f †). Therefore, Φ̂(f †) = minλ Ψ(λ), and Λ† ⊆ arg minλ Ψ(λ).
Additionally, for any λ ∈ arg minλ Ψ(λ), we have Ψ(λ) = minλ Ψ(λ) = Φ̂(f †). Since F †
includes all route flows that satisfies (17a)-(17c) and attains the minimum value of Ψ(λ),
any equilibrium route flow f ∗ ∈ F∗(λ) for λ ∈ arg minλ Ψ(λ) must be in F †. Hence, such
λ must also be in Λ† defined in (37), i.e. arg minλ Ψ(λ) ⊆ Λ†. We can therefore conclude
that Λ† = arg minλ Ψ(λ). 
Proof of Proposition 5. Following Lemma (C.2), for any λ ∈ Λ†, F∗(λ) ⊆ F †. Therefore,
the unique equilibrium edge load is w†, which does not depend on λ. Additionally, for
any feasible λ /∈ Λ†, again from Lemma C.2, Ψ(λ) >
̂
Φ(w†). Thus, w∗(λ) 6= w†. 
Proof of Theorem 4 Firstly, we show for any λ ∈ Λ†, all travelers have identical costs in
equilibrium. From Lemma C.2, we know that for any λ ∈ Λ†, the value of the weighted
potential function Ψ(λ) =
̂
Φ(w†) = minλ Ψ(λ). Consider any i, j ∈ I such that λi > 0
and λj > 0, the directional derivative of Ψ(λ) in the direction zij, ∇zijΨ(λ), must be
0. Otherwise, Ψ(λ) strictly decreases in the direction zij (resp. zji) if ∇zijΨ(λ) < 0
(resp. if ∇zijΨ(λ) > 0), which contradicts the fact that Λ† = arg minλ Ψ(λ). From (31),
we know that Ci∗(λ) = Cj∗(λ). Therefore, any two populations with positive size have
identical costs in equilibrium. We can thus conclude that the equilibrium costs faced by
all travelers are identical.
If any λ ∈ Λ† satisfies λi > 0 for all i ∈ I, then the first step in our proof is sufficient
to show that the set Λ† attains stable social fairness. Otherwise, for any λ ∈ Λ†, and
any degenerate population i ∈ {I|λi = 0}, we need to show that Ci∗(λ) ≥ Cj∗(λ), where
λj > 0. Since Λ† = arg minλ Ψ(λ) (Lemma C.2), we know that Ψ(λ) must be non-
decreasing in the direction zij. Thus, we obtain: ∇zijΨ(λ) (31)= (Ci∗(λ)− Cj∗(λ)) D ≥ 0.
Thus, Ci∗(λ) ≥ Cj∗(λ). The first and the second steps together show that any λ ∈ Λ†
satisfies (38), which implies that stable social fairness is attained in the set Λ†.
Finally, we show that any feasible λ /∈ Λ† cannot achieve stable social fairness. Since
Λ† = arg minλ Ψ(λ) (Lemma C.2), for any λ /∈ Λ†, we can claim that there must exist a
direction zij such that Ψ(λ) decreases in the direction zij, ∇zijΨ(λ) < 0. Otherwise, λ
is a local minimum of Ψ(λ), and since Ψ(λ) is convex in λ (Lemma B.5), λ is a global
minimum, which contradicts the fact that λ /∈ Λ†. For such a direction zij, there are
two possible cases: (1) λi > 0 and λj > 0. In this case, from (31), Ci∗(λ) 6= Cj∗(λ),
and thus travelers do not have identical costs in equilibrium. (2) λi = 0 and λj > 0.
In this case, from (31), we must have ∇zijΨ(λ) = (Ci∗(λ)− Cj∗(λ)) D < 0. Therefore,
Cj∗(λ) > Ci∗(λ), which implies that travelers in population j has incentive to change
subscription to TIS i. To sum up, in either case, λ cannot attain stable social fairness. 
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Folowing Roughgarden and Tardos [2004], we define the Pigou bound κ(C) as:
κ(C) = sup
c∈C
sup
x≥0,y≥0
y · c(y)
x · c(x) + (y − x) · c(y) , (C.17)
where C is the set of edge cost functions {cse(we)}e∈E,s∈S . We find that the inefficiency in
equilibrium is upper bounded by κ(C).
Proposition C.1. For any given λ, we have C
∗(λ)
Copt(λ)
≤ κ(C), and the bound is tight. If the
edge cost functions cse(we) are affine functions for all e ∈ E , s ∈ S, we have C
∗(λ)
Copt(λ)
≤ 4
3
.
Proof of Proposition C.1. From the definition of BWE in (7), we obtain:∑
r∈R
qi∗r (t
i)E[cr(q∗)|ti] = λiD ·min
r∈R
E[cr(q∗)|ti]
≤
∑
r∈R
qoptir (t
i)E[cr(q∗)|ti], ∀ti ∈ T i,∀i ∈ I. (C.18)
Define f opt as the route flow vector induced by an optimal average cost strategy qopt, and
wopt as the induced edge load vector. Following (C.18), we have:
∑
s∈S
∑
e∈E
∑
t∈T
pi(s, t)w∗e(t)c
s
e(w
∗
e(t))
(5)
=
(6)
∑
i∈I
∑
ti∈T i
Pr(ti)
(∑
r∈R
qi∗r (t
i)E[cr(q∗)|ti]
)
(C.18)
≤
∑
i∈I
∑
ti∈T i
Pr(ti)
(∑
r∈R
qoptir (t
i)E[cr(q∗)|ti]
)
(5)
=
(6)
∑
s∈S
∑
e∈E
∑
t∈T
pi(s, t)wopte (t)c
s
e(w
∗
e(t)).
(C.19)
This leads to:
Copt(λ) =
∑
s∈S
∑
e∈E
∑
t∈T
pi(s, t)cse
(
wopte (t)
)
wopte (t)
=
∑
s∈S
∑
e∈E
∑
t∈T
pi(s, t)
[
cse (w
∗
e(t))w
∗
e(t) ·
wopte (t)c
s
e (w
opt
e (t)) + (w
∗
e(t)− wopte (t)) cse (w∗e(t))
cse (w
∗
e(t))w
∗
e(t)
]
+
∑
s∈S
∑
e∈E
∑
t∈T
pi(s, t)
(
wopte (t)− w∗e(t)
)
cse (w
∗
e(t))
(C.19)
≥
(∑
s∈S
∑
e∈E
∑
t∈T
pi(s, t)cse(w
∗
e(t))w
∗
e(t)
)
·
[
min
s∈S,e∈E,t∈T
wopte (t)c
s
e (w
opt
e (t)) + (w
∗
e(t)− wopte (t)) cse (w∗e(t))
cse (w
∗
e(t))w
∗
e(t)
]
(C.17)
≥ C
∗(λ)
κ(C) .
Thus, C
∗(λ)
Copt(λ)
≤ κ(C). Consider affine cost functions, for any e ∈ E and s ∈ S, assuming
cse(we) = α
s
ewe + β
s
e , we have:
wopte (t)
(
cse (w
∗
e(t))− cse
(
wopte (t)
))
= αsew
opt
e (t)
(
w∗e(t)− wopte (t)
) ≤ 1
4
αsew
∗
e(t)
2 ≤ 1
4
w∗e(t)c
s
e (w
∗
e(t)) .
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Thus, we obtain:
C∗(λ) =
∑
s∈S
∑
e∈E
∑
t∈T
pi(s, t)w∗e(t)c
s
e(w
∗
e(t))
(C.19)
≤
∑
s∈S
∑
e∈E
∑
t∈T
pi(s, t)wopte (t)c
s
e(w
∗
e(t))
=
∑
s∈S
∑
e∈E
∑
t∈T
pi(s, t)wopte (t)c
s
e(w
opt
e (t)) +
∑
s∈S
∑
e∈E
∑
t∈T
pi(s, t)wopte (t)
(
cse(w
∗
e(t))− cse(wopte (t))
)
≤
∑
s∈S
∑
e∈E
∑
t∈T
pi(s, t)wopte (t)c
s
e(w
opt
e (t)) +
1
4
∑
s∈S
∑
e∈E
∑
t∈T
pi(s, t)w∗e(t)c
s
e(w
∗
e(t))
= Copt(λ) +
1
4
C∗(λ).
Therefore, C
∗(λ)
Copt(λ)
≤ 4
3
. Since the game with one population, one state is a special case of
our game, and the bound κ(C) is tight, we can conclude that the bound is tight as well
in Γ(λ). 
The social optimal cost Cso is defined as follows:
Cso
∆
= min
f
∑
s∈S
∑
e∈E
cse(
∑
r3e
f sr ),
s.t.
∑
r∈R
f sr = D, ∀s ∈ S,
f sr ≥ 0, ∀r ∈ r, ∀s ∈ S,
(C.20)
Proof of Proposition 6. We first show that C
∗(λ)
Copt(λ)
= 1. For any feasible strategy profile
q ∈ Q, C(q) can be written as:
C(q) =
1
D
∑
i∈I
∑
ti∈T i
Pr(ti)
∑
r∈R
E[cr(q)|ti]qir(ti)
(5)
=
(6)
1
D
∑
s∈S
∑
e∈E
∑
t∈T
pi(s, t)cse (we(t)) · we(t)
(5)
=
1
D
∑
s∈S
∑
e∈E
∑
t∈T
pi(s, t)
∫ ∑
r3e
∑
i∈I q
i
r(t
i)
0
d (cse(x) · x)
dx
dx
=
1
D
∑
s∈S
∑
e∈E
∑
t∈T
pi(s, t)
∫ ∑
r3e
∑
i∈I q
i
r(t
i)
0
(
cse(x) + x ·
dcse(x)
dx
)
dx.
Assume that the condition of the edge cost functions in Proposition 6 is satisfied. Since
hse(·) is a k-th order homogeneous function of we, we know from Euler’s homogeneous
function theorem that x · dhse(x)
dx
= k · hse(x). Therefore, cse(x) + x · dc
s
e(x)
dx
= hse(x) + b
s
e + x ·
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∂hse(x)
∂x
= (k + 1) · hse(x) + bse. The cost C(q) can be further expressed as:
C(q) =
1
D
∑
e∈E
∑
t∈T
∑
s∈S
pi(s, t)
∫ ∑
r3e
∑
i∈I q
i
r(t
i)
0
(k + 1) · hse(x)dx+
1
D
∑
e∈E
∑
t∈T
∑
s∈S
pi(s, t)
∫ ∑
r3e
∑
i∈I q
i
r(t
i)
0
bsedx
=
k + 1
D
∑
e∈E
∑
t∈T
∑
s∈S
pi(s, t)
∫ ∑
r3e
∑
i∈I q
i
r(t
i)
0
(hse(x) + b
s
e) dx−
k
D
∑
e∈E
∑
t∈T
∑
s∈S
pi(s, t)
∫ ∑
r3e
∑
i∈I q
i
r(t
i)
0
bsedx
(5)
=
k + 1
D
∑
e∈E
∑
t∈T
∑
s∈S
pi(s, t)
∫ ∑
r3e
∑
i∈I q
i
r(t
i)
0
cse(x)dx−
k
D
∑
e∈E
∑
t∈T
∑
s∈S
pi(s, t)bsewe(t)
(11)
=
(k + 1)
D
Φ(q)− k
D
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
pi(s, t) ·
(∑
r∈R
(∑
e∈r
bse
)
· fr(t)
)
Moreover, since
∑
e∈r b
s
e = b
s for any s ∈ S, and any r ∈ R, we obtain:
C(q) =
(k + 1)
D
Φ(q)− k
D
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
pi(s, t) ·
(∑
r∈R
bs · fr(t)
)
(17b)
=
(k + 1)
D
Φ(q)− k ·
(∑
s∈S
(∑
t∈T
pi(s, t)
)
· bs
)
=
(k + 1)
D
Φ(q)− k ·
(∑
s∈S
θ(s) · bs
)
. (C.21)
Since the equilibrium strategy profile q∗ minimizes Φ(q), q∗ also minimizes C(q). Thus,
C∗(λ)
Copt(λ)
= 1.
Additionally, from (C.21), we obtain that:
C∗(λ) = Copt(λ) = min
q∈Q(λ)
C(q)
(C.21)
=
(k + 1)
D
Ψ(λ)− k ·
(∑
s∈S
θ(s) · bs
)
.
Therefore, C∗(λ) is an affine function of Ψ(λ). From Lemma C.2, we know that Λ† =
arg minλ∈Λ Ψ(λ). Consequently, Λ
† = arg minλ∈ΛC
∗(λ). 
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